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SHERMAN’S MISSING “SUPPLEMENT”:
PROSECUTORIAL CAPACITY, AGENCY
INCENTIVES, AND THE FALSE DAWN OF
ANTITRUST FEDERALISM
DANIEL E. RAUCH
ABSTRACT
When the Sherman Act passed in 1890, it was widely expected that it would
operate primarily as a “supplement” to vigorous state-level antitrust enforcement of
state antitrust statutes. This did not happen. Instead, confounding the predictions of
Congress, the academy, and the trusts themselves, state antitrust enforcement
overwhelmingly failed to take root in the years between 1890 and the First World War.
To date, many scholars have noted this legal-historical anomaly. None, however, have
rigorously or correctly explained what caused it. This Article does.
Using historical and empirical research, this Article establishes that the best
explanation for the early failure of state antitrust enforcement was prosecutorial
incapacity: state attorneys general and local prosecutors simply lacked the incentives
and resources to prosecute antitrust cases. Along the way, the Article also offers a
rigorous rejection of each main alternative explanation proposed for the early failure
of state antitrust enforcement, including those based on doctrinal constraints, statestatutory texts, and contemporary politics. Finally, the Article closes by suggesting
implications this historical insight might have for the cutting-edge issues facing
today’s state antitrust enforcers, from local efforts to control healthcare costs to
multistate actions against Silicon Valley behemoths like Apple and Amazon.

 J.D. Yale Law School. I owe a debt of gratitude for the feedback, guidance, and assistance
of Attorneys General James E. Tierney (Maine, ret.) and Philip J. Weiser (Colorado), as well as
to Charles Dameron, Samuel Fox Krauss, Ray Marvin, George Priest, Doug Ross, Lynne Ross,
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“This bill, as I would have it, has for its single object to . . . supplement the
enforcement of the several States in dealing with combinations that affect injuriously
the industrial liberty of the citizens.”
– John Sherman, United States Senator, 1890.1
“We are in a world where state attorneys general need to step up for strong
competition policy.”
– Beau Buffier, New York State Antitrust Bureau, 2017.2

I. INTRODUCTION
State attorneys general are having a moment. In recent years, they have been main
players in some of the country’s most important legal and political dramas. They have
checked the Trump Administration on abortion rights,3 air quality,4 and the United
States Census.5 They have checked the Obama Administration on water rights, 6
immigration policies,7 and the Affordable Care Act.8 They have formed a (very public)
front line on issues from the opioid epidemic9 to net neutrality.10 And in a time of
1

21 CONG. REC. 2456-57 (1890) (statement of Senator Sherman).

Can Celik, State AGs Need to ‘Step Up’ for Rule of Law, NY Enforcer Says, MLEX MARKET
INSIGHT
(Mar.
30,
2017),
https://mlexmarketinsight.com/insights-center/editorspicks/antitrust/north-america/state-ags-need-to-step-up-for-rule-of-law-ny-enforcer-says.
2

3 Jessica Seaman, Colorado to Join 19 States in Lawsuit to Stop Federal Abortion “Gag
Rule”, DENVER POST (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.denverpost.com/2019/03/04/colorado-titlex-abortion-gag-rule-lawsuit/.
4 Alexander C. Kaufman, New York Just Sued The Trump EPA For Reversing Obama-Era
Air Pollution Rule, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/epasmog-pollution-lawsuit_n_5c5236e8e4b0ca92c6dd111f.
5 Aaron Katersky, 18 Attorneys General and 6 Cities File Lawsuit Over Census Citizenship
Question, ABC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/US/18-attorneys-general-citiesfile-lawsuit-commerce-department/story?id=54208211.
6

Neena Satija, Texas Sues EPA Over Provision of Federal Water Law, TEXAS TRIBUNE (June
29, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/06/29/texas-sues-obama-administration-epawater/.
7 Dara Lind, United States v. Texas, The Biggest Immigration Case in a Century, Explained,
VOX (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/4/15/11424614/supreme-court-immigrationdapa-daca.
8 Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton Sues the Feds Over Obamacare, HOUSTON PUBLIC
MEDIA
(Oct.
22,
2015),
https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/2015/10/22/127024/texas-attorneygeneral-ken-paxton-sues-the-feds-over-obamacare/.
9
Berkeley Lovelace Jr., Opioid Distributors Said to Propose $10 Billion Settlement to End
State Lawsuits, Stocks Fall, CNBC (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/06/opioidmakers-said-to-propose-10-billion-settlement-to-end-state-lawsuits.html.
10 Associated Press, Nearly Two Dozen Attorneys General Sue to Block FCC’s Repeal of Net
Neutrality
Rules,
USA
TODAY
(Jan.
16,
2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2018/01/16/nearly-two-dozen-attorneys-generalsue-block-fccs-repeal-net-neutrality-rules/1038532001/.
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federal-level gridlock, they are increasingly seen as critical sites of governance—
offices that can still “get things done.”11
As their profile grows, many suggest state attorneys general ought to take a more
central role in antitrust enforcement. Sometimes, these calls are motivated by concerns
that the federal government is not vigorously enforcing antitrust laws, leaving a “void”
to be filled.12 Sometimes, the calls are motivated by the suggestion that states enjoy
institutional advantages in antitrust enforcement, such as superior knowledge of
“market-specific information,” that make them superior enforcers.13 And sometimes,
the calls are motivated by doctrinal differences between state and federal antitrust
statutes, differences that might afford states greater freedom of action. 14 In any case,
these calls point in the same direction: when it comes to American antitrust law, state
attorneys general can, and should, be leaders.
Rhetorically, the suggestion that states should “step up” as leading antitrust
enforcers is a powerful one. It is not, however, new. When the Sherman Act was
passed in 1890, the states (as opposed to the federal government) were widely
expected to take the lead in antitrust enforcement. John Sherman himself asserted that
his Act’s “single object” was to “supplement the enforcement of the established rules
of the common and statute law by the courts of the several States.”15 Nor was he alone:
at the time of the Act’s passage, scholars, politicians, and shareholders all shared
Senator Sherman’s prediction that state enforcement agencies would be a central, if
not decisive, force in American antitrust policy.16
What happened next defied this expectation. In the years following the Sherman
Act’s passage, from 1890 until the First World War, state antitrust enforcement had
remarkably little impact or efficacy. Many scholars have noted this unexpected
failure.17 None, however, have accurately or rigorously explained it.18
This Article does. Using novel historical and empirical research, I contend that the
best explanation for the early failure of state antitrust enforcement was prosecutorial
incapacity: state attorneys general and local prosecutors without the incentives or
resources to handle antitrust cases. Along the way, I also provide a rigorous rejection
11 John Nichols, The Most Important Office in the Trump Era Isn’t at the Top of the Ballot,
THE NATION (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-most-important-office-inthe-trump-era-isnt-at-the-top-of-the-ballot/; see Alan Greenblatt, State AGs Are Increasingly
Powerful
-and
Partisan,
GOVERNING
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-state-attorneys-general.html.
12

Celik, supra note 2.

13 Erin C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, The Double-Edged Sword of Health Care Integration:

Consolidation and Cost Control, 92 IND. L.J. 55, 83 (2016).
14 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND. L.J. 375, 377
(1983) (“[A]ctivities that are not illegal under federal law are condemned by the antitrust law
of some states. Furthermore, some persons who have suffered injury because of antitrust
violations have a damages action under various state antitrust laws while they have no such
action under the federal statutes.”).
15

21 CONG. REC. 2456-57 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).

16See

infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.

17

See infra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.

18

Though not for lack of trying. See infra Part IV.
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of the leading alternative explanations for the states’ early failure to act, including
those based on doctrinal constraints, statutory text, and contemporary politics. Finally,
I close by suggesting some implications that this first, failed era of antitrust federalism
has for our own times, times where, once again, state enforcement agencies are held
out as promising leaders in American antitrust enforcement.
The remainder of this work proceeds as follows. Part II provides historical context
for the passage of the Sherman Act and for early state antitrust statutes, the role state
enforcement was expected to play, and its unexpected failure to do so.
Part III then turns to the historical and empirical record to discern why state
enforcement, widely expected to assume a central role, took almost no role at all.
Analyzing a comprehensive and novel data set of state antitrust prosecutions, this Part
quantitatively underscores the absence of state antitrust enforcement during this
period. However, the data also reveals a critical nuance: a set of “high-enforcement
states” in which state antitrust law was, in fact, enforced with at least some vigor.
Armed with this insight, Part IV returns to the initial question: why, as a general
matter, did early state antitrust enforcement fail to take root? This Part assesses four
prominent explanations that have been suggested as answers to the question: (1)
doctrinal arguments on the legality of state-level enforcement; (2) economic
arguments based on the practical efficacy of state-level enforcement; (3) institutional
arguments that the federal government’s Sherman Act authority somehow “displaced”
state activity; and (4) political arguments that public opinion or elected officials lost
interest in antitrust enforcement after passing their initial state statutes. Ultimately,
this Part rejects each of these explanations.
Part V, however, considers and rigorously tests a different explanation: that the
cost and complexity of antitrust litigation was simply beyond the capabilities of state
prosecutors. On this account, the crucial factor was a lack of “prosecutorial capacity.”
To date, this explanation has never been systematically explored, examined or
established.19 This Part does so, analyzing the novel data set of state antitrust caselaw,
the text of the states’ early antitrust laws, the structure of each state’s prosecutorial
bureaucracy, and the workings of each state’s budget processes.
Through this empirical and documentary analysis, a striking pattern emerges. In
overwhelming measure, the “high-enforcement” states, those where at least some
antitrust enforcement took place: (1) offered substantial personal financial rewards to
prosecutors who won antitrust suits; (2) offered substantial personal financial
punishment to prosecutors who failed to pursue antitrust litigation; (3) directed vastly
supernormal resources to antitrust state prosecutors; or (4) pursued some combination
of these strategies. In short, these states offered incentives or capabilities that would
make it personally easier (or more lucrative) for resource-limited prosecutors to act.
By contrast, where such direct prosecutorial incentives and resources were absent,
so was enforcement. Even in states that were politically progressive antitrust bastions.
Even in states that imposed draconian statutory penalties for antitrust violations. Thus,
the best explanation for the failure of early state antitrust enforcement was insufficient
prosecutorial enforcement incentives and capacity.
Finally, Part VI turns to the ramifications that this historical insight has on our
time, an era where, once again, we have seen greatly renewed interest in state antitrust
enforcement. By understanding what caused antitrust federalism to falter at the

19

See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
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starting gate, today’s state antitrust enforcers will be better able to achieve a different
outcome.

II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The late nineteenth century saw a host of dramatic changes in America’s economy
and society.20 Increased industrialization and urbanization brought vast wealth and
new technologies to the nation. However, it was also a time when citizens were
increasingly anxious about economic inequality and the concentration of power in the
hands of an industrial elite.21 This anxiety would, in time, give voice to a powerful set
of political movements aligned against “trusts,” those business combinations seen as
emblematic of these oppressive social forces. Indeed, this “antimonopoly
persuasion”22 was deeply felt in the press,23 popular literature,24and the nation’s
politics.25
In response to these shifts, various groups began calling for oversight and
regulation of the great corporate concentrations. The dominant motivation behind such
proposals, whether for consumer welfare, protection of small business, social justice,
or some combination, is debated today.26 Yet whatever the precise mix of motives, by
the century’s closing decades, many were passionately concerned with reigning in
large businesses.
In addressing this challenge, the era’s reformers would have been well advised to
look to state law. The common law against combinations in restraint of trade had been
applied in America’s state courts throughout the nineteenth century.27 States had long
had the power to grant—and revoke—corporate charters, a capability that let them
play a key role in the first major trust busting skirmishes. 28 Politically, many states
20 Descriptions of

this period include David Millon, The First Antitrust Statute, 29 WASHBURN
L.J. 141, 142; see Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and
Prospective: Where Are We Coming from? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 937–
38 (1987).
21 Millon,

supra note 20, at 142.

22 STEVEN L. PIOTT, THE ANTI-MONOPOLY PERSUASION: POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE RISE OF

BIG BUSINESS IN THE MIDWEST 10 (1985).
23 William T. Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L.
REV. 221, 224 (1956).
24 Rush H. Limbaugh, Historic Origins of Anti-Trust Legislation, 18 MO. L. REV. 215, 241
(1953).
25

Letwin, supra note 23, at 235.

26 For a sampling of this debate, see Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON 7 (1966); Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Origins of Antitrust: An
Interest-Group Perspective, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 73 (1985); Eleanor M. Fox, The Battle for
the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L. REV. 917, 919 (1987).
27

Barry E. Hawk & Laraine L. Laudati, Antitrust Federalism in the United States and
Decentralization of Competition Law Enforcement in the European Union: A Comparison, 20
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 18, 19 (1996). See also MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF
RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 22–23 (1986).
28

James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional
and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 495, 497 (1987).
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had electorates that were more hostile to trusts than the nation at large, especially as
represented by the industrialists who peopled the “billion dollar” fifty-first Congress.29
And even if that Congress could be persuaded to pass a law, federal policymaking was
hamstrung by a restrictive view of federal government powers. To wit, the Sherman
Act, when passed, was “only the second major exercise of the federal power,” 30 and
even given its limited scope, many doubted its constitutionality. 31
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the first moves toward antitrust enforcement came
from the states. Dramatic demonstrations first came through quo warranto suits based
on the early trusts’ corporate form. Quo warranto litigation involved states dissolving
trusts for violations of a state’s “public policy.” On this legal theory that the corporate
structure of defendant trusts violated state law, state prosecutors won several
prominent victories against major trust entities.32
In the North River Sugar Trust cases, for example, New York’s Attorney General’s
Office successfully sued to revoke the charter of an affiliate of the national Sugar
Trust.33 Along these lines, similar results were obtained by Louisiana in an early
common-law suit against an affiliate of the Cotton-Oil Trust.34
In response to this initial salvo, the great corporations increasingly restructured
themselves to avoid such corporate-form based quo warranto suits going forward,
such as by reincorporating in states with relatively permissive forms of corporate
governance.35
This did not mark the end of state-level antitrust agitation. To the contrary, across
the country states began to shift from reliance on corporate-form based, common-law
litigation to the adoption of new statutes aimed at corporate conduct: that is, they
drafted the nation’s first antitrust legislation. Typical of such laws was that of Kansas,
adopted in 1889, which stated:
That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations
between persons or corporations made with a view or which tend to
29 Robert L. Bradley, Jr., On the Origins of The Sherman Antitrust Act, 9 CATO J. 737, 739
(1990); see Werner Troesken, Did the Trusts Want a Federal Antitrust Law? An Event Study of
State Antitrust Enforcement and Passage of The Sherman Act, in PUBLIC CHOICE
INTERPRETATIONS OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 77, 80 (Jac. C. Heckelman et al. eds.,
2000).
30 Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1474
(1961). The first such exercise was the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.
31 A doubt that would soon be affirmed in dramatic fashion by the Supreme Court. See United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895).
32 For an excellent history and analysis of such

quo warranto actions, see Benjamin Woodring,
Quo Warranto: The Structure and Strength of a Common Law Antitrust Remedy, 96 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 187, 187–88 (2019).
33

E.g., People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E. 834, 838 (N.Y. 1890).

34

Louisiana v. American Cotton Oil Trust, 1 RY. & CORP. L.J. 509 (La. 1887).

35

Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of the Firm: A Historical
Perspective, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 75, 84–85 (1990); Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism,
96 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2008). That said, Benjamin Woodring has challenged this
conventional view, raising an intriguing argument that had states vigorously and creatively
pursued quo warranto suits, even such multi-state combinations might have been dismantled.
See generally Woodring, supra note 32, at 187–88.
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prevent full and free competition in the importation, transportation
or sale of articles imported into this state, or in the product,
manufacture or sale of articles of domestic growth or product of
domestic raw material or for the loan or use of money, or to fix
attorneys or doctors’ fees, and all arrangements, contracts,
agreements, trusts or combinations between persons or corporations
designed or which tend to advance, reduce or control the price or
the cost to the producer or to the consumer of any such products or
articles, or to control the cost or rate of insurance, or which tend to
advance or control the rate of interest for the loan or use of money
to the borrower, or any other services, are hereby declared to be
against public policy, unlawful and void.36
Kansas was not alone. In the years before the Sherman Act’s passage, at least 13
states had adopted antitrust laws,37 laws dependent not on a trust’s incorporation
status, but rather on its economic conduct. The language of such acts, as discussed in
greater detail in Part III.A.4, was at least as vigorous as that of the Sherman Act;
sometimes, even more so.38
In this context, when moves were made toward federal antitrust legislation, they
were heavily influenced by state-level legislation. At the outset, indeed, some even
thought that federal legislation was unnecessary, claiming state enforcement efforts
would sufficiently address the trust problem.39
Unsurprisingly, when congressional debate began in earnest in the late 1880s, state
antitrust law took center stage. For his part, Senator Sherman’s clearest statement on
the subject was that:
This bill, as I would have it, has for its single object to invoke the
aid of the courts of the United States to . . . supplement the
enforcement of the established rules of the common and statute law
by the courts of the several States in dealing with combinations that
affect injuriously the industrial liberty of the citizens of these States.
It is to arm the Federal courts within the full limits of their
constitutional power that they may co-operate with the State courts
in checking, curbing, and controlling the most dangerous

36 Act of March 2, 1889, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 389. For more on early antitrust, see HANS B.
THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 215
(1955).
37 Act of April 16, 1888, 1888 Iowa Acts 124; Act of March 2, 1889, 1889 Kan. Sess. Laws
389; Act of May 20, 1890, 1889 Ky. Acts 143; Act of March 7, 1889, 1889 Me. Laws 235; Act
of July 1, 1889, 1889 Mich. Pub. Acts 331; Act of February 22, 1890, 1890 Miss. Laws 55; Act
of May 18, 1889, 1889 Mo. Laws 96; Act of March 29, 1889, 1889 Neb. Laws 516-517; Act of
March 11, 1889, N.C. Sess. Laws 372; Act of March 3, 1890, 1889-1890 N.D. Laws 503; Act
of March 7, 1890, 1890 S.D. Sess. Laws 323; Act of April 4, 1889, 1889 Tenn. Pub. Acts 475;
Act of March 21, 1889, 1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 141.
38 For an insightful analysis of the text of these early state antitrust laws, see Charles S.
Dameron, Present at Antitrust’s Creation: Consumer Welfare in the Sherman Act’s State
Statutory Forerunners, 125 YALE L.J. 1072, 1084–85 (2016).
39

Limbaugh, supra note 24, at 219; see also Letwin, supra note 23, at 245–46.
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combinations that now threaten the business, property, and trade of
the people of the United States . . .40
Or, as the Report of the House Judiciary Committee stated: “Whatever legislation
Congress may enact on this subject within the limits of its authority, will prove of little
value unless the States shall supplement it by such auxiliary and proper legislation as
may be within their legislative authority.”41
This view was widely shared.42 In contrast, the power of federal-level enforcement
was seen as quite limited. Many legislators expressed hesitation, arguing that
constitutional limits largely barred the federal government from any antitrust
enforcement.43 Tellingly, these same sources shared a faith that the states did have the
constitutional power to address the problems of economic concentration—a sentiment
that, as shown below, contemporary courts often shared.44
To be sure, Sherman Act’s drafters differed in their intentions and expectations.
Even today, their overall purposes are hotly debated. Yet as the above discussion
shows, to the extent legislative history is relevant, it suggests a Congress that expected
the primary locus of antitrust enforcement to be the states.
Strikingly, this understanding was largely shared by the shareholders of the trusts
themselves. As a path-breaking analysis by Werner Troesken makes clear, event
studies show that share prices dropped far more from the advent of various state
antitrust laws and state antitrust cases than from the passage of the federal Sherman
Act, suggesting that capital feared the states more than the Sherman Act.45 The era’s
scholars, too, shared this view, as seen in the focus of leading contemporary treatises
on state, as opposed to federal, antitrust laws and cases.46 In sum, when Senator
Sherman declaimed that his Act that would serve merely as a “supplement,” he echoed
what politicians, businesspeople, and academics all believed to be the most plausible
outcome.
What happened next was a surprise. Put simply, state-statutory antitrust
enforcement was a bust. James Rahl, for example, notes that “even in the most
exuberant formative years of American antitrust policy, few state laws were
vigorously enforced.”47 Roger W. Stone described the record of state antitrust
40

21 CONG. REC. 2456-57 (1890).

41

Millon, supra note 20, at 149. See Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 378; May, supra note 28,
at 503–04; Hawk & Laudati, supra note 27, at 20.
42 See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2614 (1890) (statement of Sen. Coke) (observing “Congress has
not the power to deal fully with this subject” and that states will be drawn to pass similar
legislation); id. at 2469-70 (statement of Sen. Reagan) (citing necessity of state enforcement to
fully combat monopolistic practices); Bork, supra note 26, at 31–35.
43 21 CONG. REC. 1460 (1889) (statement of Sen. George); 21 CONG. REC. 1769 (1890)
(statement of Sen. George); 21 CONG. REC. 2463-67 (1890) (statement of Sen. Vest); 21 CONG.
REC. 2467-68 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hiscock).
44

See infra Part IV.A.

45

Troesken, supra note 29, at 80.

46

May, supra note 28, at 504.

47

James A. Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy, 39 TEX. L. REV. 753, 753
(1961).
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enforcement in this period as “meager,” adding “[s]tate antitrust enforcement efforts
are remarkable for their absence.”48 Hans B. Thorelli flatly wrote that states were “not
very active in prosecuting combinations.”49 Stephen Rubin notes that “as events were
to prove . . . Sherman’s expectations of continuing state enforcement” did not survive
“the enactment of the statute that carries his name.”50 And Andrew Gavil observed
that “State regulation of the trusts . . . quickly proved to be inadequate to the task.” 51
Or, as Benjamin Woodring pungently summarized: “[i]t is a commonplace that states
in the late nineteenth century were unable to prosecute continuously successful
antitrust policy.”52
Lawyers and historians are therefore left with a mystery: what accounts for such
an unexpected outcome? Why did the states stay sidelined? We now turn to this
question.

III. THE EMPIRICAL PATTERN OF EARLY STATE ANTITRUST INACTION
Contrary to what contemporary politicians, scholars, and companies believed, state
antitrust enforcement failed to take off in the era of the Sherman Act. Why? To begin
answering this question, this Part presents and analyzes a novel and comprehensive
data set of all relevant instances of state statutory antitrust prosecutions from 1889 to
1914. This data set, in turn, will form the foundation for a rigorous account of this
early absence of state enforcement.
As a first step, it is important to set out the methodology I chose in generating this
record: (1) what states were considered; (2) what time period was reviewed; (3) how
cases were found; and (4) which cases were ultimately included.
The first question is what states to select. This analysis asks why the vigorous statelevel enforcement envisioned by the Sherman Act’s drafters did not come to pass. To
address this question, I limited the study to the nineteen states which were “present at
the creation” of federal antitrust—that is, states that had active statutory or quasistatutory53 antitrust regimes at or around the time of the Sherman Act’s drafting.
Eighteen of these states had antitrust statutes in place by 1891. The first thirteen,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas, had antitrust statutes
that predated the enactment of the Sherman Act. A fourteenth, Montana, adopted a
constitutional amendment in 1889 requiring the promulgation of such a law, 54 and

48 Roger W. Stone, Reviving State Antitrust Enforcement: The Problems with Putting New
Wine in Old Wine Skins, 4 J. CORP. L. 547, 554 (1979).
49

THORELLI, supra note 36, at 156.

50

Stephen Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 653, 661 (1974).

51

Andrew I. Gavil, Reconstructing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 657, 658 (1993).
52

Woodring, supra note 32, 187–88.

53

See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.

54 MONT. CONST.,

art. XV, § 20 (1889).
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apparently did so soon after.55 Four other states, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana and
Minnesota, adopted antitrust laws in the year following the Sherman Act’s passage.56
The inclusion of the final state, New York, requires a bit more explanation. New
York did not adopt its antitrust statute until 1897.57 However, from 1889 on, the state
had engaged in aggressive and sustained common-law antitrust prosecutions,58
lawsuits which were important and much-discussed inspirations for the Sherman Act
itself.59 Given this prominent position, I treat New York as having a “quasi-statutory”
regime as of the passage of the Sherman Act, and so include it in this study. That said,
this work only analyzes the Empire State’s (fully) statutory prosecutions. In any case,
this decision is not of much analytic moment: even if New York were excluded, each
of this Article’s empirical and historical conclusions would still stand.
The second key question is what time period would be considered. This study
focuses on the time period from the enactment of the first Sherman Act analogs in
1889 until the end of 1914, allowing for analysis of these statutes across a generation
without needing to address the confounding variable of World War I, whose impact
on state antitrust may well have superseded any of the dynamics this paper examines.60
Notably, this coincides with what scholars frequently term the “Formative Period” of
American antitrust enforcement.61
The third question is how to identify all prosecutions in which these states
employed their Sherman-law analogues. To search for such cases, I first identified all
cases in the target states that included “State,” “People,” “Commonwealth” or
“Attorney General” as a party, and that also included some variant of the word
“monopoly.”62 I then broadened my search to include all opinions in the target states
that included both some variant of the word “trust” and some variant of the word
“combination.”63

55 Just how soon is not clear from the available historical record, but at the latest, the Montana
antitrust statute was in force by 1895. 8 CODES AND STATUTES OF MONTANA § 321 (1895).
56

Act of Feb. 7, 1891, 1891 Ala. Laws 438; Act of June 11, 1891, 1891 Ill. Laws 206; Act of
July 5, 1890, 1890 La. Acts 90; Act of April 20, 1891, 1891 Minn. Laws 82–83.
57 1897

N.Y. Laws 313.

58

E.g., People v. Duke, 44 N.Y.S. 336 (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1897); People v. Milk Exch. Ltd.,
39 N.E. 1062 (N.Y. 1895); People v. Sheldon, 34 N.E. 785 (N.Y. 1893); People v. N. River
Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1890).
59

E.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2459 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (discussing People v. North
River Sugar Refining Co. as an example of successful state-level enforcement, while arguing
that the existence of multi-state trusts also required a federal solution).
60

Stone, supra note 48, at 554–55.

61 See, e.g., Rahl, supra note 47, at 753 (defining “formative years” of antitrust as ending with
World War I); John C. Brinkerhoff Jr., Note, Ropes of Sand: State Antitrust Statutes Bound by
Their Original Scope, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 353, 358 (2017) (same). But see James May, The
Role of the States in the First Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of Antitrust
Policy, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 93, 97 (1990) (setting end of formative period as 1918); Stone, supra
note 48, at 554, 619 (defining the end of the formative period as 1910).
62

Search of the Westlaw database, conducted August 15, 2019.

63

Search of the Westlaw database, conducted August 15, 2019.
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After completing these searches, I then checked my results by using two other
sources. First, I reviewed all state-law cases cited by Joseph E. Davies’s 1915 treatise
on antitrust enforcement, which was considered authoritative at the time.64 I also
reviewed the collection of state law cases gathered by Hans B. Thorelli in his seminal
and exhaustive The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of an American Tradition.65
Finally, once I had generated search results through this process, I eliminated two
types of cases not relevant to this study. First, because the focus of this work is on
statutory prosecutions, I screened out those few prosecutions brought under commonlaw theories.66 Second, in the early twentieth century, a number of states in the study
adopted bans on price discrimination that were, to greater or lesser degrees, Clayton
Act analogues, not Sherman Act analogues.67 For analytical clarity, these, too, were
excluded.
The end result of this process was a data set of 71 unique state antitrust
prosecutions, which generated 105 opinions (as some complex cases generated more
than one court ruling). The full set opinions and prosecutions, organized by state, is
presented as this Article’s Appendix. The summary, along with the number of federal
antitrust prosecutions in the same period, is as follows:
Table 1: Total State Antitrust Prosecutions and Related Judicial Opinions,
1889-1914

State

Number of State Antitrust
Statute Opinions

Missouri

14

15

Texas

12

17

Kansas

10

13

New York

7

12

Kentucky

6

21

Mississippi

6

7

Nebraska

4

6

Tennessee

4

5

Illinois

3

3

Michigan

2

2

Minnesota

2

3

Montana

1

1

Alabama

0

0

Iowa

0

0

64 JOSEPH
65

State Antitrust
Statute Prosecutions

E. DAVIES, TRUST LAWS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 466–72 (1st ed. 1916).

THORELLI, supra note 36.

66

E.g., State v. Craft, 83 S.E. 772 (N.C. 1914) (notwithstanding the existence of a North
Carolina antitrust law, prosecution was brought under a common-law theory).
67E.g.,

State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 133 N.W. 895 (Iowa 1911).
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Louisiana

0

0

Maine

0

0

North Carolina

0

0

North Dakota

0

0

0

0

71

105

14868

N/A

South Dakota
Total State
Prosecutions
Federal Sherman
Act prosecutions
during same period
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In Part V, these data will be explored in much greater detail. For now, however,
two features are worth noting. On one hand, the prevailing view that state antitrust
enforcement proved lackadaisical finds considerable support. Among these nineteen
states—states that presumably were among the most committed to antitrust
enforcement, because they passed the first state antitrust statutes—ten saw two or
fewer prosecutions, and seven saw none.
Indeed, contrary to the then-prevailing wisdom, the overall enforcement rate of
state antitrust lagged well behind that of federal antitrust, with only about half as many
state prosecutions reported.69 To be sure, the comparison is imperfect, since the
available federal data capture “antitrust cases instituted by the Department of
Justice,”70 while presumably not all initiated state antitrust prosecutions resulted in
reported opinions. Yet, even if state antitrust prosecutions were on par with federal
suits, for at least six reasons this would still be striking:
(1) Many state electorates and polities were far more progressive than the federal
government, suggesting the pressure would be for more, not less, vigorous
enforcement;
(2) Many state statutes were more specific and targeted than the federal Sherman
Act, appearing to grant more vigorous enforcement authority;
(3) Federal-level enforcement (and federal legislation generally) was
comparatively novel (as noted, the Sherman Act was only the second such law to be
passed);
(4) The constitutional validity of federal antitrust law was far from settled, while
state-level economic enforcement had repeatedly been upheld as valid;
(5) In many states there were no recorded antitrust prosecutions whatsoever; and
(6) In large measure, contemporary observers from the drafters of the Sherman
Act, to corporate shareholders, to legal scholars, believed that vigorous state-level
enforcement would be forthcoming.
That said, notwithstanding this surprising pattern of inaction, an important nuance
emerges: in some states, at least some state antitrust enforcement did take place. Six
jurisdictions in particular, Missouri, Texas, Kansas, New York, Kentucky and

68 Richard Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366
(1970).
69

Id.

70

Id.
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Mississippi, can be thought of as “high enforcement” states—places where six or more
antitrust prosecutions took place during the period at issue. Some of the states on this
list, like Texas, Missouri, and New York, have been identified as having relatively
robust early antitrust regimes.71 Others, like Kansas, come as something of a surprise.72
In any case, the upshot is a picture of two quite different antitrust regimes. In most
of the country, vigorous state enforcement—the enforcement the Sherman Act had
anticipated—simply did not happen. Yet in a few states, at least some such
enforcement did occur. Armed with this insight, we must now consider what these
data can tell us about our central problem: why did the expected vigorous state-level
antitrust enforcement fail to take place?

IV. FOUR FAILED EXPLANATIONS
In the previous Part, I presented new empirical data that confirmed an old
conclusion: while state-level enforcement was expected to play a vigorous and vibrant
role in the wake of the Sherman Act, it seldom did. In this Part, I assess four prominent
explanations that have been offered for this surprising outcome: (1) doctrinal
arguments on the permissibility of state-level enforcement; (2) economic arguments
based on the practical efficacy of state-level enforcement; (3) institutional arguments
that the federal government’s Sherman Act authority had displaced state activity; and
(4) political arguments that public opinion or political figures simply lost interest.
None, however, survives scrutiny.

A. Doctrinal Limits of State Enforcement?
The first broad category of explanations for the failure of early state antitrust
enforcement is doctrinal. Under such arguments, irrespective of states’ intentions, they
lacked sufficient legal power to pursue meaningful antitrust enforcement. In turn, this
category is divided into three lines of attack: (1) arguments that the dormant
Commerce Clause prevented states from regulating the trusts; (2) arguments that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause precluded effective state antitrust
enforcement; and (3) arguments that, on their own terms, the text of state statutes did
not permit the effective prosecution of antitrust violations. Each of these claims is
considered below.

1. The Dormant Commerce Clause
A first doctrinal argument stems from the so-called “Dormant Commerce Clause.”
Under Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, states are forbidden from legislating
when doing so would have a significant adverse effect on interstate commerce.73
Analyzing this doctrine, some have argued that early state antitrust laws were in

71

See George F. Sieker, The Role of the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement--Some Views
and Observations, 39 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1961); Rahl, supra note 47, at 754.
72

But see Millon, supra note 20 (discussing Kansas’s early antitrust history)

73

Martin Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L. J. 569, 570 (1987).
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constitutional peril from the start, since enforcing them might impose unacceptable
economic effects beyond state borders.74
There is no doubt that lawyers of the 1890s thought certain types of economic
activity could be off-limits to state antitrust enforcement: indeed, this assumption is
partially what motivated the passage of the Sherman Act.75 However, these categories
were not very broad and, therefore, would not have substantially reduced the capacity
for state-level enforcement. To the contrary, the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of
this period was, if anything, hostile to federal, not state, interventions. Perhaps the
leading example of this tendency is the 1895 case of United States v. E. C. Knight
Co.76 There, the federal government brought a Sherman Act prosecution against a
group of major sugar manufacturers, all operating within Pennsylvania. Although
these manufacturers collectively possessed an enormous share of the sugar market, the
Court found this challenge to be beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, finding
the factories were engaged merely in “manufacture,” and not in the transport of goods
across state lines.77 Yet in doing so, at least some believe that the Court was motivated
not so much by a laissez-faire defense of corporate wealth, but by an effort to buttress
state authority over the intrastate operations of interstate combinations.78
Accordingly, throughout the period at issue in this analysis, it would have been
most logical to conclude, as a doctrinal matter, that state power to regulate the
economy, even if such regulations impacted events beyond state borders, was quite
robust. Indeed, this point would be confirmed by the Supreme Court in Justice
Holmes’ opinion in Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky v. Tennessee.79 In that case, a
Kentucky-based corporation appealed from a conviction under Tennessee’s state
antitrust statute, arguing that under the Constitution, a state’s courts could not levy
criminal penalties against an out-of-state corporate entity.80 In particular, it argued
such penalties would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause because it would
constitute one state imposing impermissible regulations across state lines. 81 The Court
disagreed, instead finding that each state clearly had jurisdiction to regulate economic
effects caused within its jurisdiction, even if caused by out-of-state actors:
The present statute deals with the conduct of third persons, strangers
to the business. It does not regulate the business at all. It is not even
directed against interference with that business specifically, but
against acts of a certain kind that the state disapproves in whatever
connection. The mere fact that it may happen to remove an
E.g., Gavil, supra note 51, at 682–83 (“Although Congress responded directly to Wabash
by enacting the Interstate Commerce Act, the implications of the case did not go unnoticed by
advocates of antitrust legislation. If the states lacked the power under the dormant Clause to
regulate rail rates, would they be permitted to regulate the trusts?”).
74

75

May, supra note 28, at 509 n.85.

76

156 U.S. 1 (1895).

77

Id.

78

May, supra note 28, at 512 (emphasis added).

79

217 U.S. 413, 422; see also Rubin, supra note 50, at 671.

80

Standard Oil Co., 17 U.S. at 419.

81

Id. at 422.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020

15

2020]

SHERMAN’S MISSING “SUPPLEMENT”

187

interference with commerce among the states as well with the rest
does not invalidate it. It hardly would be an answer to an indictment
for forgery that the instrument forged was a foreign bill of lading,
or for assault and battery, that the person assaulted was engaged in
peddling goods from another state. How far Congress could deal
with such cases we need not consider, but certainly there is nothing
in the present state of the law, at least, that excludes the states from
a familiar exercise of their power.82
To be sure, this power would be limited since “Congress would have understood
that state imposition or regulation of direct restraints of interstate commerce would
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.”83 However, on the whole, the power
available would have been considerable, especially since, as discussed below,
America’s economy at this time was far more concentrated at the state level anyway.84
Thus, the Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence of this era would not have seemed
to be a fatal obstacle to effective state antitrust enforcement.

2. Fourteenth Amendment Arguments
Another set of doctrinal objections stem from the Fourteenth Amendment. This
claim is that state antitrust laws might violate the Equal Protection Clause by
arbitrarily discriminating among groups. Specifically, some litigants argued that state
antitrust laws that exempted certain classes of economic actors, such as farmers, but
not others, such as industrialists, violated the clause.
In Illinois, this sort of differential treatment did receive an initial rebuke in
Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Company.85 Here, the Supreme Court considered an
1893 amendment to Illinois’s antitrust law that exempted the agricultural sector,
stating “the provisions of this act shall not apply to agricultural products or live stock
while in the hands of the producer or raiser.”86 The Supreme Court struck down this
provision, holding that under the Fourteenth Amendment, this special exemption for
farmers was not reasonable.87
At first, this would seem to be a serious impediment to effective state antitrust
regimes. After all, the political coalitions that pressed hardest for state antitrust statutes
often wanted to exempt themselves. To wit, at least some states “wanted both
agricultural associations and effective anti-trust laws.”88

82 Id.
83 Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An Essay
for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2161, 2181–82 (2015).
84

See infra notes 1032–1043 and accompanying text.

85

184 U.S. 540 (1902).

86

1893 Ill. Laws 520; see also id. at 556 (discussing agricultural exemption).

87

Connolly, 184 U.S. at 564–65; see Comment, The Illinois Anti-Trust Law Disinterred, 43
ILL. L. REV. 205, 211 (1948).
88 The Illinois Anti-Trust Law Disinterred, supra note 87, at 212; see, e.g., 1897 Tenn. Pub.
Acts 241–42 (exempting agriculture and livestock from state antitrust coverage); 1893 Ill. Laws
520 (same).
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Ultimately, though, Connolly did not end up greatly reshaping state antitrust laws.
For its part, Illinois’ courts subsequently held that, though the 1893 amendment to the
antitrust law had been struck down, the remainder of the law would stay in force. 89
Beyond Illinois, only Montana appears to have adopted the Connolly reasoning to
strike down its antitrust statute, which it did in 1905.90 Yet just a few years later, the
Montana legislature, undeterred, passed essentially the same law, which this time
stayed on the books.91 By contrast, courts in most other states simply found ways to
distinguish away the Connolly precedent.92 And in any case, many of the most
important state statutes included no such industry-specific exemptions at all: in those
jurisdictions, Connolly would have no limiting impact whatsoever. Accordingly, while
Connolly may have created some degree of “confusion” among the states for a time,93
this seems insufficient to explain why so many states failed to effectively use their
antitrust laws—or why a select few used such laws with relatively great frequency.

3. State Statutory Text
A final doctrinal argument is the state antitrust statutes themselves were simply
insufficiently vigorous to allow for effective prosecution. 94 Proponents of this
approach sometimes latch on to language perceived as unduly verbose or anachronistic
to suggest that the statutes in question would not have offered a viable enforcement
mechanism.95 This interpretation, however, seems misguided. Instead, if anything, the
language of early state antitrust statutes offered more efficacious redress than the
federal analog. As Werner Troesken observes:
As for enforcement mechanisms, the Sherman Act was limited to
authorizing the U.S. Attorney General to enforce the law. State
antitrust laws threatened their attorneys general with imprisonment
and fines for failure to enforce antitrust violations (Kansas); allowed
attorneys general to keep a percentage of all fines won in antitrust
cases (Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, and North Carolina); and required
all businesses in the state to regularly file affidavits swearing they
were not associated with any illegal combinations (Illinois, Maine,
Missouri, South Carolina, and Texas). If a business failed to file
such an affidavit, it risked incurring a large fine or having its
corporate charter revoked. One state (South Dakota) required its
attorney general to file suit whenever they received a sworn affidavit
89

The Illinois Anti-Trust Law Disinterred, supra note 87, at 212.

90

State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 33 Mont. 179 (1905).

91

Act of March 6, 1909, 1909 Mont. Laws 128.

92

Rubin, supra note 50, at 662–63.

93

Id. at 666.

94
John J. Flynn, Trends in Federal Antitrust Doctrine Suggesting Future Directions for State
Antitrust Enforcement, 4 J. CORP. L. 479, 481 (1979) (“Recognition of an independent
responsibility to enforce state antitrust statutes has, in many states, raised at least two immediate
problems. The first is the fact that many state antitrust statutes are inadequate in substantive
scope, jurisdictional reach, enforcement tools and/or remedies.”).
95

Rahl, supra note 47, at 760 (noting, though ultimately rejecting, the argument that this
sometimes-overwrought drafting waylaid state enforcement efforts).
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from a private citizen declaring he had been harmed by a
monopolistic combination . . . . Where the Sherman Act was vague
and narrow, state antitrust laws were precise and sweeping,
expressly prohibiting a broad class of potentially anti-competitive
[conduct].96
It is thus highly unlikely that the specific language of state antitrust statutes
account for such widespread state inactivity. Moreover, this conclusion is further
supported by two crucial pieces of evidence. First, the data gathered in Part II does not
reveal a pattern of total inactivity. Instead, it reveals that in at least some states,
statutory prosecutions were both viable and consequential. Second, even as state
enforcement languished, private suits brought under state antitrust law were brought
considerably more frequently,97 suggesting statutory text sufficient to viably address
antitrust violations.

B. Practical Efficacy of State Prosecutions?
Shifting away from doctrine, a second set of arguments is even if state antitrust
litigation would have been legally viable, it would not, as a practical matter, be
effective in breaking up the trusts. This argument takes several forms.
First, following early state successes using common-law quo warranto theories,
various companies restructured their forms to immunize themselves from such
litigation.98 On this logic, some argue that state prosecutions would simply not be
effective, since corporations could simply shift their form to avoid state jurisdiction.
Of course, the original form of quo warranto suits brought against entities like
New York’s Sugar Trust affiliate99 were probably rendered non-viable by changes in
corporate structure.100 Yet, the new forms of antitrust enforcement embodied by the
state statutes, enforcement that looked not to corporate form but to economic activity,
proved effective against even the most complex and sophisticated trusts of the age, 101
often yielding substantial penalties.102
A variant on this argument is the claim that even if states did have power to
regulate their internal economies, this power would not be efficacious given the interstate nature of the major trusts. As noted previously, however, state economic
regulatory power during this time was generally given a wide berth, extending even to
entities that were based well outside the state. And, notwithstanding the expansion in
the size and scope of businesses, a substantial amount of economic activity unfolded
within state borders, and so would be well within the state’s reach even under this
96 Troesken, supra note 29, at 86–88 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); see May,
supra note 28, at 499–500; Dameron, supra note 38.
97 Stone, supra note 48, at 554; NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE NEW YORK ANTITRUST LAWS 7A n.43 (1957).
98 For a discussion of these suits, and the trusts’ response, see supra notes 32–35 and
accompanying text.
99 See

supra note 33 and accompanying text.

100

Crane, supra note 35, at 14.

101

See infra Part V.A.

102

See id.
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theory. Indeed, as late as the 1960’s, most antitrust violations the Department of
Justice prosecuted unfolded within a single state’s jurisdiction.103 Seventy years
before, in an era of “relatively insignificant commercial intercourse between the
states,”104 this concentration would only have been more pronounced.
A final efficacy argument concerns the fear that antitrust enforcement, far from
being too weak, was in fact too strong, and so risked scaring away businesses from the
state. According to this argument, state antitrust enforcement failed because
prosecutors were chary of driving large economic entities out of business or out of the
community.105
While initially intuitive, this argument from business concerns faces several
serious flaws. As a matter of political economy, much of the agitation for antitrust law,
and many of the most potent political interest groups in states, were incumbent local
business owners who feared national entrants.106 Given this influence, it seems odd to
assert that a prosecutor or governor’s incentives would be to avoid antitrust
enforcement to keep big businesses in-state. If anything, one would expect the
opposite: that causing the exit of large out-of-state competitors would be viewed as a
political victory.107
Moreover, as a matter of economics, vigorous antitrust enforcement, far from
driving businesses away, would actually create superior competitive and economic
conditions, and would arguably create more economic activity in the long run.108 Last,
the argument that state enforcement lagged due to fears of driving away business
seems to presuppose that, if found liable, companies would be either ousted from the
state or would leave voluntarily. Yet it is far from clear that this happened. To the
contrary (and to the dismay of some prosecutors) courts seldom ordered complete
ousters, but instead ordered massive fines against companies, suggesting that, at least
in large measure, states that vigorously enforced antitrust could “have their cake and
eat it too.”109

C. Federal Government “Displacement”?
A third argument, sometimes suggested but rarely precisely elaborated, is that
federal antitrust law somehow “displaced” state enforcement. On this account, once
state officials saw that the federal government had enacted the Sherman Act, they
decided to stop enforcing their own statutes in response. Describing this approach,
Werner Troesken writes:

103 Robert C. Fellmeth, Antitrust Enforcement by Local Prosecutors: Impediments and
Prospects, 14 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 3 (1978); see Rahl, supra note 47, at 759.
104

Rubin, supra note 50, at 667.

105

The Commerce Clause, supra note 30, at 1472; May, supra note 28, at 501–02.

106 Troesken, supra note 29, at 84; see Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Antitrust before the
Sherman Act, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST-THE PUBLIC-CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE 255–70 (Fred S. McChesney & William F Shughart II eds., 1995).
107

However economically wise or unwise such a decision might be.

108

Stone, supra note 48, at 574.

109

HENRY R. SEAGER & CHARLES A. GULICK, JR., TRUST AND CORPORATION PROBLEMS 361,
365 (1929).
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The work of Gabriel Kolko suggests another way the trusts might
have perceived a federal antitrust law as beneficial. According to
Kolko, businesses of all kinds – railroads, banks, insurance
companies, and so on – lobbied for increased federal regulation and
control because they believed it would forestall more hostile forms
of regulation taking place at the state and local level.110
On this reading, as one commenter asserted, the Sherman Act’s passage, in and of
itself, “sounded the death knell for state enforcement efforts.” 111
Such appeals to an ill-defined federal “displacement” of state law leave much to
be filled in. It is possible the “displacement” they refer to is the formal displacement
of federal preemption. If so, then the doctrinal arguments outlined earlier would seem
to conclusively dispose of this. Yet in any case, once again, the data do not support
such an interpretation, since if the federal government had broadly “displaced” state
prosecutions, one would not expect to find so much of it in the “high enforcement”
states. And, if the Sherman Act really was supposed to “displace” state antitrust laws,
it proved an unambiguous failure, as a host of states adopted new antitrust laws or
strengthening old ones in the decade following the Act’s passage. 112

D. Shifting Political Interests?
As a final possibility, some argue that the lack of enforcement can be explained by
a change in political interests. Under this framework, the electorate’s passion for trust
busting culminated in the passage of antitrust statutes, both state and federal. Yet, by
the time these laws were in place, public interest had waned, such that vigorous
enforcement of said laws was not desired by the public, and was not pursued. 113
One rough measure of public sentiment involves the partisan affiliations of the
state legislators in question. Perhaps if antitrust statutes had been passed by one party,
and then a second party took power, this would account for a policy of nonenforcement. Yet, this is not what happened.

110

Troesken, supra note 29, at 80 (internal citation omitted).

111

David A. Upah, State Anti-Merger Policy: Divesting the Federal Government of Exclusive
Regulation, 12 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 533, 533 (1981).
112 See, e.g., The Cartwright Act, 530 Stats. of Cal. §§ 1-12 (1907); Kan. Gen. Stat. § 30–67
(1897); Neb. Gen. Stat. § 162–22; Tex. Gen. Stat. § 146–5 (1899).
113 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 48, at 552–53 (“The state antitrust laws and the Sherman Act
were the catharsis of this public indignation. It was recognized by most astute politicians at the
time that what was needed was ‘a ceremonial concession to an overwhelming public demand
for some kind of reassuring action against the trusts.’”).
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Table 2: Legislative Control By Party Passing Initial State Antitrust Bill, 1889
- 1914

Years Both Houses
Controlled by Same
Party as Original
Enactors

Years One House
Was Controlled
by Same Party as
Original Enactors

Years Neither
House Was
Same Party as
Original
Enactors114

Alabama

24

0

0

Illinois

18

2

4

Iowa

24

0

2

Kansas

24

2

0

Kentucky

19

4

0

Louisiana

24

0

0

Maine

22

0

2

Michigan

22

0

2

Minnesota

0

22

2

Mississippi

24

0

0

Missouri

18

6

0

Nebraska

16

2

6

New York

13

2

2

North Carolina

20

2

2

North Dakota

24

0

0

South Dakota

24

0

0

Tennessee

24

0

0

Texas

24

0

0

Total

364

42

22

These data are a model of consistency: for 85% of the time of this study, both
houses of a given state’s legislature were controlled by the parties that held them when
the first antitrust statute was passed. Another ten percent of the time, at least one house
was held by the original party.

114 Statistics here drawn from MICHAEL J. DUBIN, PARTY AFFILIATIONS IN THE STATE
LEGISLATURES: A YEAR BY YEAR SUMMARY, 1796-2006 (2007). Table 2 omits Montana,
however, since both its House and Senate passed antitrust law by legislatures divided equally
by party. See id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2020

21

2020]

SHERMAN’S MISSING “SUPPLEMENT”

193

Further support for this conclusion is provided by the number of states that,
throughout this period, enacted additional antitrust legislation aimed at strengthening
the previous regime.115
In sum, an explanation based on shifting partisan allegiances cannot account for
the failure of early state antitrust (or, for that matter, for the relative activity of the
“high enforcement states”).

V. PROSECUTORIAL CAPACITY AND AGENCY INCENTIVES
In this Part, I consider an alternative explanation for state inactivity, one that has
at times been suggested, but that has yet to be systematically proven. This is the
“prosecutorial capacity” explanation: state antitrust enforcement was shaped mainly
by the structure, incentives and powers of state attorneys general and other local
prosecutors. On this account, states failed to engage in vigorous antitrust enforcement
because state prosecutors lacked the capacity, resources, and incentives to undertake
antitrust prosecutions.
Antitrust prosecutions are famously resource-intensive, lasting years and costing
substantial amounts of money.116 These costs were very much present at the start of
antitrust enforcement. Kentucky’s case against International Harvester, for example,
lasted five years, involved at least fourteen Commonwealth attorneys (including some
from a private law firm), and generated thirteen reported opinions. 117
Given these costs, some suggest state prosecutorial offices were simply not up to
the task of enforcing antitrust law. As Hans Thorelli asserted:
That states were not very active in prosecuting combinations may
be attributed to a number of reasons. Sheer inertia or lack of
independence on the part of the prosecuting authorities, in addition
to the lack of funds and personnel, generally played a large part. For
an attorney general to mass sufficient data to secure a conviction of
a large combination with practically unlimited resources was indeed
a formidable task.118
Uncharacteristically though, Thorelli’s mention of prosecutorial incapacity is not
supported by any citations or corroborated by any other evidence. He is not alone:
while others have made passing suggestions that structural constraints of prosecutorial
offices could have limited state enforcement, a review of the literature reveals no
support for this assertion beyond the authors’ naked intuitions. 119
See, e.g., 1897 Ill. Laws 153 (“Trusts, Pools, Combines, Etc.”); 1901 N.C. Sess. Laws 820
(“An act to protect trade, commerce and transportation from combination, monopoly and
conspiracy”); Act of March 13, 1905, 1905 N.D. Laws 336–40 (“Anti-trust law”); Act of March
23, 1903, 1903 Tenn. Laws 1726 (proposed act to “declare unlawful and void all arrangements
and contracts, agreements, trusts or combinations made with a view to lessen or which tend to
lessen free competition in the importation or sale of articles imported into this State.”).
115

116

Breck P. McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV.
L. REV. 27 (1950).
117

See infra Appendix.

118

THORELLI, supra note 36, at 156.

See Gavil, supra note 51, at 658 (stating, without citation, that “states proved no match for
the trusts in their heyday.”); John J. Miles, Current Trends in Antitrust Enforcement, 47 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST L.J. 1341, 1344 (1979) (noting, among other “possible reasons” for state antitrust’s
119
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Of course, this is not to say that the intuition behind this prosecutorial capacity
approach is unsound. To the contrary, as an initial matter, there are at least three
reasons to suspect this account to be plausible.
First, a prosecutorial capacity theory is supported by the states’ frequent hiring of
private firms to help bring antitrust suits. In examining the newly-gathered empirical
record, I identified 13 prosecutions (of 71 total) in which states indisputably hired
private counsel,120 a number that is almost surely an underestimate.121 That these suits
regularly drove states to hire (presumably costly) outside legal services strongly
suggests the challenges of funding sufficient prosecutorial capacity.
Second, a capacity-based explanation would echo the well-documented claim that
similar enforcement-resource difficulties explain the early apathy of federal antitrust
regulators, who have likewise been accused of under-enforcement of the federal
Sherman Act.122

early failure, “lack of interest by the attorney general, lack of effective investigative tools, [and]
lack of full-time personnel,” but offering no citation for the point); Rubin, supra note 50, at 661
n.40 (citing only Thorelli’s unsupported passage, discussed supra notes 113–14, to conclude
that “among [the reasons early state antitrust law was not enforced was] . . . lack of funding of
prosecuting offices”); Stone, supra 48, at 625 (stating, without citation, that “[t]he proper scope,
procedures, and funding are preconditions to effective enforcement”); Upah, supra note 111, at
533 (asserting, without citation, that “explanations for the failure of state legislators and
agencies to pursue an aggressive antitrust policy include perceived state resource limitations”).
120 People ex rel. McIlhany v. Chicago Live-Stock Exch., 48 N.E. 1062 (Ill. 1897); In re Bell,
76 P. 1129 (Kan. 1904); State v. Jack, 76 P. 911 (Kan. 1904); State v. Smiley, 69 P. 199 (Kan.
1902); Am. Seeding Mach. Co. v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W. 972 (Ky. 1913); Int’l Harvester
Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W. 760 (Ky. 1912); Commonwealth v. Int’l Harvester Co.
of Am., 145 S.W. 400 (Ky. 1912); Int’l Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth, 145 S.W. 393 (Ky.
1912); Commonwealth v. Int’l Harvester Co. of Am., 144 S.W. 1068 (Ky. 1912); Int’l Harvester
Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W. 1064 (Ky. 1912); Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v.
Commonwealth, 144 S.W. 1070 (Ky. 1912); Att’y Gen. ex rel. James v. Nat’l Cash Register
Co., 148 N.W. 420 (Mich. 1914); State v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 126 N.W. 126 (Miss.
1910); State v. Jackson Cotton Oil Co., 48 So. 300 (Miss. 1909); S. Elec. Sec. Co. v. State, 44
So. 785 (Miss. 1907); State v. Omaha Elevator Co., 110 N.W. 874 (Neb. 1906); State v. Omaha
Elevator Co., 106 N.W. 979 (Neb. 1906); State v. Chilhowee Woolen Mills, 89 S.W. 741 (Tenn.
1905); Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. Co. v. State, 87 S.W. 336 (Tex. 1905); Waters-Pierce Oil
Co. v. State, 106 S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 103 S.W. 836
(Tex. Civ. App. 1907); Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. Co. v. State, 88 S.W. 370 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1905). Twelve of these prosecutions featured, as named counsel for the State, an entity
with an ampersand in its name (i.e. Carroll & Carroll); the thirteenth, Michigan’s Attorney Gen.
v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., was the subject of a contemporary government report describing the
hiring of a private attorney to prosecute the litigation. See MICH. BOARD OF AUDITORS, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE BOARD OF STATE AUDITORS FOR THE STATE OF MICHIGAN FOR THE YEAR 1913,
16 (1913).
121
For instance, W.A. Guild appeared as counsel for Tennessee in its Standard Oil litigation.
State ex rel. v. Standard Oil Co., 110 S.W. 565 (Tenn. 1908). A search for “W.A. Guild” in
Tennessee reveals no other opinions in which he appeared as state’s counsel. However, between
1905 and 1912, Guild does appear as counsel for various private litigants in at least five cases.
Westlaw search, conducted January 18, 2016.
122 E.g.,

WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 103–06 (1981).
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Finally, per Nicholas Parillo’s insightful argument, state antitrust prosecutions
may have netted local prosecutors less political payoff than more conventional suits,
since antitrust crimes are against a relatively diffuse, amorphous class of victims,
while traditional crimes have highly visible (and thus, perhaps, especially grateful)
victims.123 This observation meshes well with an explanation based around
prosecutorial incentives and structures, since it suggests a further mechanism by which
the design and incentives of a state’s prosecutorial offices would impact its level of
state antitrust enforcement.
Yet these arguments, however intuitive, are not sufficient to establish that
prosecutorial capacity and incentives were, in fact, the cause for the early failure of
state antitrust enforcement. To prove this point, we must look to the data.
The balance of this Part, therefore, offers the first rigorous and empirically-based
analysis of exactly how the incentives and resource constraints facing state prosecutors
impacted the prosecution of antitrust cases during the first decades after the Sherman
Act’s passage. In particular, I focus on whether there were meaningful differences
between the antitrust-prosecutorial structures of the “high enforcement” states and
those of the “low enforcement” states. Here, I examine contemporary state statutes,
prosecutorial budgeting systems, and agency regulations. Based on this data, I
conclude that state prosecutorial capacity and agency incentives furnish the most
cogent explanation for why, in defiance of expectations, early state antitrust
enforcement fizzled.

A. The Big Picture: Prosecutorial Incentives and Resources Matter
To engage in this study, I looked to several types of primary and historical sources
including: the text of each state’s initial antitrust statute passed, with the exception of
New York, between 1888 and 1891; all amendments made to these statutes during the
period at issue; generally applicable statutes regarding Attorney General incentives;
generally applicable statutes regarding the incentives of local prosecutors;124 and
contemporary budget data of how much funding state Attorney General offices
received through legislative appropriations. An overview of the results of this survey
is presented as Table 3.
Table 3: Prosecutorial Incentives, Agency Resources, and State Antitrust
Suits: 1889-1914

State
MO

Prosecutions
14

123

Prosecutorial Incentives
1889: One-fifth of fine given to AG or
local prosecutor; total fine is 1% to
20% of capital invested in corporation.

Antitrust
Resources
1895: If
conviction,
AG receives

NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940 271–72 (2013).

IN

124 This analysis uses the generic “local prosecutor” to refer to any of the state’s a regionallybased prosecutors, a position that all states shared but which, depending on the state, might be
designated as a “Commonwealth’s attorney,” e.g., 1898 Ky. Acts 214., “state’s attorney,” e.g.,
53 ILL. REV. STAT. § 8 (1898) or by some other title.
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1895: One-fourth of fine given to local
prosecutor; fine measured as $5 to
$100 per day of violation. Local
prosecutor/AG also get $25 to $500 if
charter forfeited.
1889: AG gets 10% of first $1,000 of
fine, 5% of fine above $1,000, cap at
$2,000 per year. Local prosecutor gets
10% of first $1,000 of fine, 5% of fine
above $1,000, for local prosecutor, no
cap. Fine is $50 per day.
1899: 25% of fine to local prosecutor,
no cap; AG — same as 1889; fine is
$200 to $5,000 per day.
1889: 5% of all fines to local
prosecutor, fine is $100 to $1,000 per
party violating. Misdemeanor for local
prosecutors to “fail, neglect or refuse”
to prosecute trust; fined $100-$500,
jailed 10-90 days, forfeit office
1897: 5% of all fines collected to local
prosecutor, fine is $100 to $1,000 per
party violating, plus $100 per day.

[68:172
all costs and
actual
expenses for
prosecution of
suits.
None.

TX

12

KS

10

NY

7

None.

KY

6

MS

6

$250 to $2500 per violation to local
prosecutor, cap at $3,500/year.
None.

NE

4

1891: None.
1897: $25 to $100 for local prosecutor.

TN

4

1889: $175 minimum for first offender
to AG; $300 minimum for second
offender to AG.
1891: Payments to AG removed from
statute.

IL

3

$10 for local prosecutor.

1891: None.
1905: $10,000
for antitrust.
Only AG
allowed to
prosecute; no
local
prosecutor
permitted.
None.

MI

2

None.

None.

MN

2

None.

None.

MT

1

None.

None.

AL

0

$ 10 for local prosecutor.

None.
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If AG
prosecutes
may “appoint
as many
assistants as
sees fit” and
“for such
services he . . .
shall receive
the same fee”
as local
prosecutor.
Extensive [see
Part V.B.5].
None.
None.
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0

LA

0

ME

0

NC

0

ND
SD
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1890: One-fifth of fine to AG or local
prosecutor; total fine is 1% to 20% of
capital invested in corporation.
1907: $100 to $500 to AG or local
prosecutor.
$15 for local prosecutor; $20 to $65 to
AG.
None.

None.

None.

0

1889: $10 for AG
1899: $100 to $500 for local
prosecutor; $10 for AG.
None.

0

None.

None.

None.
None.

None.

Based on these data, several trends emerge. The most important, for our purposes,
is that the high-enforcement states overwhelmingly featured: (1) large direct
incentives for prosecutors who win antitrust suits; (2) direct penalties for prosecutors
who fail to bring such suits; (3) special resources for bringing antitrust prosecutions;
or (4) some combination of the above. In contrast, even a quick survey reveals that in
low enforcement states, these conditions were not present. With this in mind, we can
now turn in greater detail to each state, and see the degree to which questions of
prosecutorial capacity and incentives shaped antitrust enforcement.

B. Proof Points for Prosecutorial Capacity
Having painted the overall picture of where the data lead, I now look more closely
at various states, both “high enforcement” and “low enforcement,” to show in greater
detail the ways that their prosecutorial incentive structures and administrative
resources shaped antitrust enforcement behavior.

1. Missouri
Missouri was the state that launched the most antitrust prosecutions in the study,
at fourteen. These enforcement efforts are especially notable for the diversity of
industries targeted: between 1889 and 1914, the state launched suits against
insurers,125 lumber companies,126 tobacco manufacturers,127 and others. Commentators
have often noted this aggressive record of enforcement.128
In pursuing these prosecutions, Missouri’s state attorneys were given powerful
statutory incentives. In the initial 1889 statute, for each successful antitrust
prosecution, the Attorney General or the local prosecutor would be entitled to onefifth of the fine levied against the defendants: in the event that both the Attorney
General and a local prosecutor brought the suit, they would each receive a one-eighth
125 State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 52 S.W. 595, 596 (Mo. 1899); State ex rel.
Crow v. Aetna Ins. Co., 51 S.W. 413 (Mo. 1898).
126

State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Ark. Lumber Co., 169 S.W. 145, 148 (Mo. 1913).

127

State ex rel. Crow v. Cont’l Tobacco Co., 75 S.W. 737 (Mo. 1903).

128 E.g.,

Sieker, supra note 71.
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share. This fine, in turn, was measured as 1%-20% of capital invested in
corporation.129 Over the next six years, though, the state brought only one recorded
prosecution.130
Perhaps in response, in 1895, Missouri changed its incentive structure: going
forward, local prosecutors would receive one-fourth of the total fine, but the fine
would be measured as $5-$100 per day of violation131 (which, if a violation was found
to have begun years previously, would yield a generous recovery indeed). 132
Additionally, the 1895 legislation stated that the prosecuting attorney would
receive between $25-$500 if the corporation’s charter was forfeited.133 Finally, while
the Attorney General was no longer eligible to receive a fraction of the reward, he
would have vastly extended capacity to bring suit: if a conviction was received, the
Attorney General was to receive all costs and actual expenses for prosecution of
suits.134 The result? After the amendment, Missouri brought some 13 state antitrust
prosecutions in the period at study, the most of any state in the union.
Accordingly, Missouri seems to be a strong example of a jurisdiction where the
challenges of engaging in costly and time-intensive antitrust suits were greatly
mitigated by prosecutorial incentives and resources, especially under the amended
state antitrust law.

2. Texas
Texas is another state that has traditionally been recognized as having had a
relatively strong antitrust enforcement program during this time. 135 The state’s most
prominent antitrust suits, a pair of prosecutions against various iterations of the
Waters-Pierce Oil Company, spanned a decade and involved a substantial
commitment of resources.136 In total, the state saw twelve distinct prosecutions during
the period under review.
To a greater degree than even Missouri, Texas created personal economic
incentives for prosecutors. When its first antitrust statute was passed in 1889, Texas’s
bounty system was a fundamental part of its prosecutorial structure. To wit, for any
129 1889 Mo. Laws 97 (setting out percentage of capital stock to be fined); id. at 97–98 (setting
recovery fraction for local prosecutors and Attorney General).
130

State ex rel. Att’y. Gen. v. Simmons Hardware Co., 18 S.W. 1125 (Mo. 1892).

131 1895 Mo. Laws 238 (updating penalty provision to a per diem fine). See May, supra note
28, at 502 (“[B]y the end of 1915, courts in Missouri levied unsuspended fines of $678,000
against defendants in five actions charging violations of that state’s antitrust standards.”).
132 See, e.g., Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 106 S.W. 918, 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907) (noting,
within a similar day fine regime, a jury instruction to the effect that a violation had been in effect
for each day between May 31, 1900 and March 31, 1903). See also id. at 168 (state had originally
argued for a start date of January 1, 1870).
133 1895 Mo. Laws 240 (updating recovery fraction for local prosecutors, removing fraction
paid to Attorney General).
134

1895 Mo. Laws 239–40 (providing costs for Attorney General if successful in suit).

135

THORELLI, supra note 36, at 595–96; SEAGER & GULICK, supra note 109, at 352.

136 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 106 S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907); Waters-Pierce Oil
Co. v. State, 103 S.W. 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907); State v. Waters-Pierce Oil Co., 67 S.W. 1057
(Tex. Civ. App. 1902); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 44 S.W. 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898).
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fine or penalty he recovered, an Attorney General was to receive 10% of the first
$1,000 of fine, and 5% of fines above $1,000 (though subject to a cap of $2,000 per
year).137 Local prosecutors were given a similar incentive package: $1,000 of fines,
and 5% of fines above $1,000; they, however, faced no cap to recovery.138
Given this background mechanism, when the 1889 statute set the penalty at $50
per day, it ensured a persuasive motive for prosecution. 139 And in 1899, the Texas
legislature poured gasoline on the fire: going forward, the penalty for antitrust
violations would be $200-$5,000 per day,140 and local prosecutors would be entitled
to receive 25% of the recovery, with no cap or maximum at all. 141 These incentives
netted huge payoffs for winning prosecutors. In the prominent example, the second
prosecution against Waters-Pierce Oil, the verdict netted Texas prosecutors a $1.8
million fine, paid in dramatic fashion in the form of a wheelbarrow full of small bills
walked to the state treasury.142 Nor was this the only lucrative recovery.143 Given the
incredibly high possible rewards, it is thus unsurprising that Texas pursued state
antitrust suits with such great energy.

3. Kansas
To date, commentators have largely overlooked Kansas’s role in early state
antitrust enforcement. As the data shows, however, this would be a mistake. While a
relatively small state in terms of population and economic heft, Kansas brought ten
statutory prosecutions during the period under study, including suits in industries from
cement manufacturing144 to grain harvesting.145
To provide the incentives and resources for prosecutors to bring such complex and
demanding suits, Kansas offered both carrots and sticks. On one hand, like Missouri
and Texas, it offered financial incentives for judicial victory. When its 1889 law was
passed, local prosecutors were entitled to receive 5% of all fines collected during the
course of their work.146 As in Texas, this meant that when Kansas passed a damage
provision of $100 to $1,000 per party violating,147 it created a potentially important
payoff. In 1897, the magnitude of this payoff increased exponentially when, in
137 Act effective Sept. 1, 1895, 24th Leg., R.S. tit. XLV, ch. 1, art. 2440, reprinted in Revised
Civil Statutes of the State of Texas, at 482–83 (Austin, Eugene von Boeckmann 1895).
138

Id. at 88.

139

1889 Tex. Gen. Laws 142.

140

Id. at 247–48.

141

Id. at 250–51.

142 Susan Beth Farmer, Introduction: Dual Enforcement of State and Federal Antitrust Laws,
58 ANTITRUST L.J. 197, 198 (1989).

Will Wilson, The State Antitrust Laws, 47 A.B.A. J. 160, 161 (1961) (“Again the state in
1909 recovered from seven oil companies a total sum of $216,720, and in 1913 recovered
another penalty of $500,000 from another oil company.”).
143

144

State v. Monarch Portland Cement Co., 111 P. 487 (Kan. 1910).

145

State v. Int’l Harvester Co. of Am., 106 P. 1053 (Kan. 1910).

146

Kan. Gen. Stat. § 30-67 (1897).

147 1889

Kan. Sess. Laws 390–91.
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addition to a $100 to $1,000 fine, defendants would also be charged $100 per day of
violation.148 As a result, at least as of 1897, Kansan local prosecutors could win a
substantial personal reward for pursuing antitrust suits.
At the same time, however, the 1889 Kansas law also offered a unique disincentive
for prosecutors who failed to zealously enforce the law:
It shall be the duty of the county attorneys to diligently prosecute
any and all persons violating any of the provisions of this [antitrust]
act . . . If any county attorney shall fail, neglect or refuse to faithfully
perform any duty imposed upon him by this act, he shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined
in any sum not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five
hundred dollars, and be imprisoned in the county jail not less than
ten nor more than ninety days; and such conviction shall operate as
a forfeiture of his office . . .149
This powerful sanction, unmatched in any of the other states in the study, created
a very personal incentive for prosecutors to give priority to antitrust violations, lest
they languish in jail.
Finally, in the event local prosecutors proved they were “unable or . . . neglect[ed]
or refuse[d] to enforce provisions of this act,” the Kansas Attorney General was given
both a duty to step into the fray and extensive additional resources to pursue such an
action:
[W]henever the county attorney shall be unable or shall neglect or
refuse to enforce provisions of this act in his county, or for any
reason whatever the provisions of this act shall not be enforced in
any county, it shall be the duty of the attorney-general to enforce the
same in such county, and for that purpose he may appoint as many
assistants as he shall see fit . . . and for such services he or his
assistants shall receive the same fee that the county attorney would
be entitled to for like services . . .150
In sum, Kansas offered antitrust prosecutors a unique combination of financial
rewards for victory, financial and carceral punishment for failure, and extended
prosecutorial capacities to pursue this complex class of cases. Given these dynamics,
it becomes far less surprising that Kansas appears near the top of the enforcement list.

4. Kentucky
Kentucky’s antitrust program features six suits brought over the period under
study, including one of the most extensive and complex antitrust suits of the era: the
International Harvester case.151 As was true of Missouri, Texas and Kansas, the
Bluegrass State offered personal financial incentives to local prosecutors [known as

148

1897 Kan. Sess. Laws 483.

149

1889 Kan. Sess. Laws 390–91.

150 Id.
151Int’l

Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W. 760 (Ky. 1912), reversed 234 U.S.
589 (1914).
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“Commonwealth’s Attorneys”]: a fine of $250-$2500 per violation,152 with a cap at
$3,500/year.153 Once again, a significant pecuniary reward went hand-in-hand with a
relatively active antitrust program.

5. New York
The Empire State was undeniably an antitrust powerhouse. From 1897 (the year it
passed an antitrust statute) to 1914, New York brought at least seven antitrust
prosecutions, including complex, multi-year litigation against the American Ice
Company.154 This enforcement, in turn, continued a vigorous pre-statutory pattern of
antitrust actions, including highly influential common-law suits against sugar,
tobacco, and milk monopolies.155
Unlike the first four of the “high enforcement” states, New York did not offer any
financial incentives for prosecutors who won antitrust suits (or punishments for failure
to bring such litigation). It did, however, offer a set of prosecutorial resources
unmatched anywhere else in the nation.
New York’s Attorney General’s office has, since the start of the Republic, been
seen as an influential stepping-stone to higher office.156 Whether because of this
tradition or from other factors, by the 1890’s, New York’s Attorney General had
dramatically more prosecutorial and investigatory resources than his counterparts in
any other state. In 1893 for instance, New York’s Attorney General had a staff budget
of $18,887157 and a staff of ten.158 In contrast, Illinois, the state with the next-most

152

Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Kentucky 223 (1889), codified at Ky.
Statutes §3917 (1889) (setting penalty for violations at $500 to $5,000); Ky. Statutes § 124
(1899) (Commonwealth’s Attorney “shall receive . . . fifty per centum of all judgments for fines
and forfeitures rendered in favor of the Commonwealth . . .”).
153

Ky Statutes, 1898, Ch. 8, §119, §125 (stating that Commonwealth attorney will receive
$500 in salary and that total compensation, combining fees and this salary, cannot exceed
$4,000).
154 People v. Am. Ice Co., 120 N.Y.S. 41 (App. Div. 1909); People v. Am. Ice Co., 120 N.Y.S.
443 (Sup. Ct. 1909); People v. Am. Ice Co., 104 N.Y.S. 858 (App. Div. 1907); People v. Am.
Ice Co., 105 N.Y.S. 650 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
155 People v. Duke, 44 N.Y.S. 336 (Sup. Ct. 1897); People v. Milk Exch., 39 N.E. 1062 (N.Y.
1895); People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1890).
156 Christopher Lucas, The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire and the Merrill Lynch Analyst Ratings
Scandal: Legislative and Prosecutorial Responses to Corporate Malfeasance, 1 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 449, 455 (2007) (“In fact, New York State’s third Attorney General was
none other than the original publicity seeking politician: Aaron Burr.”).

For consistency, this analysis defines “staff budget” as the amount of money spent on
Attorney General staff salaries, including all active personnel (i.e. both lawyers and
stenographers, both full- and part-time), but excluding both money spent on pensions for former
employees and the Attorney General’s own salary.
157

158

Annual Report of the State Treasurer, DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, 116th Sess. 119–120 (1893).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol68/iss2/6

30

202

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[68:172

significant office, had a staff budget of $6,400 for a staff of five. 159 Missouri, for its
part, had a budget of $4,000, used to hire a single attorney.160
Ten years later, at the time when New York was bringing many of its statutory
antitrust prosecutions, the disparity had grown even starker: in 1902, New York’s staff
budget was around $75,000, used to hire about 26 staff members. 161 In contrast, in
1903 Illinois allocated just $15,600, used to hire seven staff. 162 As of 1901, Texas
allocated $8,500 for the hiring of just five staff members, while Kansas allocated
$5,500 to hire four.163
By 1912, New York’s Attorney General office had reached relatively gargantuan
proportions: that year, the office had a staff budget of $176,204, used to hire 81
personnel.164 That same year, Illinois allocated just $40,000 for a staff of 17. 165 In
1913, Texas allocated $27,980 for 13 staff members, while Kansas hired seven
personnel with $11,600.166
Table 4: Attorney General Office Staff Funding
1892-93
NY

$18,88167

159

1893 Ill. Laws 57.

160

1889 Mo. Laws 15.

1901-03
$55,562 + ≈$20,000
Investigation Staff168

1911-13
for

$178,881

161 Annual Report of the State Treasurer, DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, 116th Sess. 338–39 (1902).
162

1903 Ill. Laws 73.

163

1903 Kan. Laws 17.

164

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 164–165 (1912).

165

1911-1912 Ill. Laws 2nd Spec. Sess. 25–26.

166 Data for Tables 4 and 5 came from these sources. 1911-1912 Ill. Laws 2nd Spec. Sess. 25–
26; 1903 Ill. Laws 73; 1892 Ill. Laws 57.; 1913 Kan. Laws 3–4; 1903 Kan. Law 17; 1893 Kan.
Law 49.; 1911 Mich. Acts 166; 1903 Mich. Acts, Pt. II, 47–48; 1893 Mich. Acts 215–16; 1913
Mo. Laws 41; 1901 Mo. Laws 47; 1889 Mo. Laws 15; 1913 Tex. Laws 122; 1901 Tex. Laws
14–15; 1893 Tex. Laws 130–131; COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 164–165 (1912); Annual Report of the State
Treasurer, DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 125th Sess. 338–339 (1902);
Annual Report of the State Treasurer, DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK,
116th Sess. 119-120 (1893).
167 This figure is almost surely an underestimate, since the 1893 report only counts only those
monies actually expended, whereas the other figures in table 4 are drawn from the total amount
appropriated, a figure often larger than actually spending. Compare ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 164–165 (1912) with Annual Report of the State
Treasurer, DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 125th Sess. 338–339 (1902).
168 The 1902 State Treasurer Report allocates $28,111 to the “Investigation District Attorney’s
office New York City.” Annual Report of the State Treasurer, DOCUMENTS OF THE SENATE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 125th Sess. 338-339 (1902). However, it does not specify how much
of this money was to be spent on staff, or how many staff this would account for. As 1912,
however, it was confirmed that this New York City office had a staff of fourteen and a personnel
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$6,400
$9,350
$4,000
$3,700
$2,500

$12,120
$8,500
$5,000
$5,500
$10,000

203
$40,000
$32,100
$31,500
$11,600
$12,000

Table 5: Attorney General Office Staff Members

NY
IL
TX
MO
KS
MI

1892-93
10
5
5
1
3
n/a

1901-03
20 + ≈6 Investigation Staff
8
5
1
4
n/a

1911-13
77
17
13
≈10 169
7
n/a

In his 1900 Report, New York’s Attorney General wrote “perhaps the most
important matter of litigation” his office faced was an anti-trust suit—the prosecution
of the American Ice Company.170 When he made this statement, he did so as the head
of an office with the ability to bring extraordinary resources to bear, resources
sufficient to take on even the era’s biggest cases. Accordingly, New York’s experience
counts as another point in favor of the prosecutorial capacity theory.

6. Nebraska
Another illustration of the role of prosecutorial capacity comes from Nebraska.
Nebraska is technically a low-enforcement state, having pursued just four antitrust
suits in the period under study. However, the timing of these suits is telling: from 1890
until 1905, Nebraska did not pursue any antitrust prosecutions. Then, in 1905, the
Nebraska legislature made a substantial commitment to prosecutorial capacity,
enacting the following statute:
[T]here is hereby appropriated . . . to be expended under the
direction of the governor and attorney general of this state, the sum
of ten thousand dollars for the enforcement of the provisions of this
act in the employment of special counsel and agents by the governor
and attorney general to conduct proceedings, suits and prosecution
under this act, in the courts of this state. 171
budget of $37,800. COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, 164–165 (1912). Conservatively, I assume that roughly $20,000 of the
$28,111 allotment of 1902 was spent on personnel, and that this resulted in the hiring of six
employees.
169
The Missouri appropriations bill allocates funding for four assistant Attorney-Generals. It
then allocates $7,500 for “salaries of stenographers,” but does not say how many individuals
this will be. I have estimated the number at six. 1913 Mo. Laws 41.
170 JOHN C. DAVIES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y. FOR THE YEAR
ENDING IN DEC. 31, 1900, at 8 (1901).
171 1905 Neb. Laws 644–46 (emphasis added) (appropriating $10,000 “to be expended under
the direction of the governor and attorney general of this state, the sum of ten thousand dollars
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Soon thereafter, four cases were brought in short order 172—a pace which, had it
been sustained throughout the period under review, would have put Nebraska squarely
into the “high enforcement” camp.173

7. The Low Enforcement States
In the previous subsections, I considered the “affirmative” part of the prosecutorial
capacity hypothesis: states with generous prosecutorial incentives and agency
resources would see more antitrust prosecution activity. The “negative” corollary, of
course, is that states that did not provide for such capacity would not pursue
prosecutions. In the overwhelming majority of low-enforcement states, this was
indeed the case.
The first low-enforcement state, Tennessee, did not establish robust incentives for
antitrust enforcement. As of 1889, the Attorney General could collect only around
$300 per antitrust conviction.174 Just two years later, even this limited incentive was
removed.175 Local prosecutors were ineligible to receive any payments at all; indeed,
they were legally barred from bringing antitrust suits. 176 Among other things, this
meant that in times when, for political or personal reasons, the Attorney General was
reluctant to bring suit, no other party could step into the breach.177 Given these
structures, it is unsurprising that Tennessee pursued just four antitrust suits during the
twenty-five years of this study.
North Carolina, another low-enforcement state, awarded a token $10 bonus from
1889 through 1899 for antitrust convictions won by the Attorney General. 178 In 1899,
it amended this bonus to give local prosecutors between $100 and $500 per successful
conviction.179 This incentive, however, was much lower than that the rewards offered
for the enforcement of the provisions of this [antitrust] act in the employment of special counsel
and agents by the governor and attorney general to conduct proceedings, suits and prosecution
under this act, in the courts of this state.”).
172 State v. Am. Sur. Co., 135 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1912); State v. Am. Sur. Co., 133 N.W. 235
(Neb. 1911); Howell v. State, 120 N.W. 139 (Neb.1909); State v. Adams Lumber Co., 116 N.W.
302 (Neb. 1908); State v. Omaha Elevator Co., 110 N.W. 874 (Neb. 1906); State v. Omaha
Elevator Co., 106 N.W. 979 (Neb. 1906).
173 Since Nebraska had four prosecutions in nine years, one would expect between eleven and
twelve total over the full twenty-five year period, putting the state between Texas and Kansas.
174

1889 Tenn. Laws 475 (noting that, for any violation, the Attorney-General shall collect
$50, plus fifty percent of the overall penalty ($250 for first offenders, $500 for second
offenders)).
175 1891

Tenn. Laws 428.

176 1889 Tenn. Laws 475 (stating Attorney General “shall prosecute all such cases ex officio,
without any other prosecutor”).
177

E.g., Clark L. Hildabrand, Interactive Antitrust Federalism: Antitrust Enforcement in
Tennessee Then and Now, 16 TRANSACTIONS 67, 84 (2014) (documenting personal political
pressures deterring Tennessee’s Attorney General from antitrust enforcement).
178 Revisal of 1905 of North Carolina, ch. 66, §2746 (noting that Attorney General shall
receive $10 for each conviction affirmed in the state Supreme Court).
179

1899 N.C. Sess. Laws 854 (noting local prosecutors will receive a fee between $100 and
$500 for each conviction under antitrust statute).
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by other states, and was unaccompanied by any special prosecutorial resources. As a
result, it does not seem to have shifted the state’s antitrust enforcement: North Carolina
saw no antitrust prosecutions during the course of this study.
Nine other “low enforcement” states reflected the same dynamic. South Dakota,
North Dakota, Maine, Montana, Minnesota, and Michigan offered no financial bonus
for antitrust convictions at all. Three others offered only token bonuses: Alabama
($7.50 for local prosecutors),180 Illinois ($5 to $20),181 and Louisiana ($15, though a
bonus of $20 to $65 if the Attorney General brought the suit himself). 182 None of these
nine states offered any special prosecutorial resources or funding for antitrust suits.
In these states, the result was an almost total lack of enforcement. Alabama,
Louisiana, Maine, North Dakota, and South Dakota brought no suits at all during the
period under review. Montana brought one, Michigan and Minnesota brought two
each, and Illinois, one of the nation’s largest and richest states, brought just three. In
total, these nine states brought nine antitrust prosecutions in the twenty-five year
period of this study—fewer than Kansas alone. These states differed dramatically in
their size, region and politics. Yet they were united in providing no special
prosecutorial incentives or resources to pursue antitrust suits, and, as a result, they
were united in their overall absence of state antitrust prosecutions.
* * *
In sum, of the six “high enforcement” states, five (Missouri, Texas, Kansas,
Kentucky, and New York) offered either powerful personal incentives for antitrust
prosecution or extensive specialized resources to fund such prosecutions or both.
Meanwhile, of the thirteen “low enforcement states,” eleven offered little to no
incentive to prosecutors and no special resources to pursue such prosecutions. A
twelfth, Nebraska, only offered substantial prosecutorial resources in 1905—and when
it did, it prosecuted at a rate as fast as any of the “high enforcement states.”
Before concluding this analysis, however, I consider the two outliers: The first,
Iowa, is a state with seemingly generous incentives, without many prosecutions. The
second, Mississippi, apparently offered no special incentive or resources, but still saw
fairly vigorous enforcement.

C. The Outliers
This subsection reviews the two seeming outliers to the prosecutorial capacity
theory: Iowa and Mississippi.

1. Iowa
From 1890 to 1914, Iowa prosecutors did not bring a single antitrust suit. Under
the prosecutorial capacity explanation, this is an unexpected result, since Iowa’s 1890
law initially seems to have allowed for a quite generous prosecutorial recovery:
§ 5062 . . . . [Any] corporation . . . , company, firm or association .
. . violat[ing any] of this act, . . . shall be punished by a fine of not
ALA. CODE § 4561 (1897). (“For each conviction of a misdemeanor, not otherwise
provided for . . . ”).
180

181

52 ILL. REVISED STAT. § 8 (1898).

182

1896 La. Acts 308; id. at 34 (noting Attorney General receives five per cent on all amounts
collective by him); 1892 La. Acts 122 (violation punished by fine of between $100 and $1,000).
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less than one per cent of the capital . . . or amount invested in such
[corporate entity] . . . and not to exceed twenty per cent . . .
§ 5067 . . . . any prosecuting attorney, or the attorney general,
securing a conviction under the provisions of this act, shall be
entitled, in addition to such fee or salary as by law he is allowed for
such prosecution, to one-fifth of the fine recovered. 183
This provision would appear to offer a large potential windfall to state prosecutors.
For instance, if a corporation had $100,000 invested in an entity found guilty, 184 and
the judge leveled a 20% fine, the prosecutor would be entitled to $4,000. Why then,
would this incentive have been ineffective?
While the issue is not entirely clear, it seems as though this percentage-based
incentive simply proved much less enticing than it superficially seemed. Perhaps this
is because, due to the vagaries of corporate structure, sophisticated (thus, larger) trusts
would find ways to minimize in-state capital, reducing the amount of possible
recovery. Moreover, percentage-based awards might be unpredictable, since they
would depend on the corporation’s size at any given time.
Might this explain why Iowa’s incentives did not generate prosecutions? Two facts
suggest it does. First, Missouri, in its original 1889 statute, adopted an incentive
structure identical to Iowa’s: a fine of 1% to 20% of the capital stock invested in the
state, with prosecutors to receive one-fifth if successful.185 Yet in the six years this
structure was in effect, only one Missouri prosecution was brought.
Within just a few years, however, Missouri abandoned this system in favor of a
more predictable and direct incentive: for each day of violation, whatever the
corporate form, convicted corporations would be fined between $5 and $100.186 And
in the years following this switch, Missouri brought 13 of its 14 prosecutions.
Given the Missouri legislature’s obvious interest in antitrust enforcement,187 it is
unlikely this shift was accidental, or that it was intended to dampen prosecutorial
ardor. And indeed, under its second incentive regime, Missouri became the most active
antitrust enforcer in the nation. Accordingly, Missouri’s abandonment of the “1% to
20%” approach suggests a percent-based valuation, for whatever reason, was an
insufficient call to action.
As importantly, in 1907, Iowa itself abandoned the “1% to 20%” approach in favor
of fixed fines.188 This, too, suggests that whatever its intuitive plausibility, the
incentive model Iowa used was not compelling to prosecutors. Through this lens,
Iowa’s failure of enforcement is considerably less surprising than it initially appears.
183 1890

Iowa Acts 42–44 (emphasis added).

Not an implausible figure. E.g., S. Elec. Sec. Co. v. State, 44 So. 785 (Miss. 1907) (“it was
agreed that these parties should organize a securities holding company under the laws of the
state of New Jersey, with a capital stock of $100,000”).
184

185

1889 Mo. Laws 97 (setting out percentage of capital stock to be fined); id. at 98 (setting
recovery fraction for local prosecutors and Attorney General).
186

1895 Mo. Laws 237 (updating penalty provision to a per diem fine).

For a description of the degree to which Missouri’s various political groups supported such
measures, see Boudreaux et al., supra note 106, at 262.
187

188 1907

Iowa Acts 185.
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2. Mississippi
Mississippi poses a more difficult problem for the prosecutorial capacity approach.
As a state with six antitrust prosecutions, it falls just within the range of the “high
enforcement” states. However, Mississippi prosecutors were not given personal
incentives to pursue antitrust prosecutions: indeed, local prosecutors were
constitutionally forbidden from receiving any fees apart from their assigned salary. 189
Nor, apparently, were any special resources appropriated to antitrust cases. As a result,
Mississippi is the only high-enforcement state to feature none of the institutional
structures identified in this Part.
There are, of course, possible explanations for why Mississippi was nonetheless
able to achieve a high rate of prosecution. For instance, four out of six of the
prosecutions in this study occurred after 1906.190 This suggests that the state’s 1906
adoption of large day fines might have induced the state to act.191 Ultimately, however,
not enough is known to make any definitive conclusion, except to say the Magnolia
State does not match the pattern.
At days end, however, even if Mississippi cannot be adequately explained by this
Article’s argument, this does not seem fatal to the overall project. Indeed, given the
complex dynamics at work, the fact that eighteen of the nineteen states in the study
can be well-explained as reflections of prosecutorial capacity is an important and
analytically powerful result.
In sum, based on the empirical and historical record, prosecutorial incentives and
agency capacity are the best explanation for the unexpected early failure of state
antitrust law.

VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
One hundred and thirty years ago, state legislatures passed America’s first antitrust
laws. They did so in a time of deep economic instability,192 of increasing concern over
corporate power,193 of unprecedented technological disruption,194 of stark and rising

189 MISS.
190

CONST. of 1890, art. VI, § 174.

See infra Appendix.

191 For confirmation that this provision was initially adopted in 1906, see MISSISSIPPI STATE
BAR ASSOCIATION, ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MISSISSIPPI STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 78 (1906).
For the provision as codified in 1906, see 1906 Miss. Laws ch.145, § 5004 (current version at
MISS. CODE ANN. §75-21-7 (2019)).
192

Fox & Sullivan, supra note 20, at 937–38.

193

Millon, supra note 20, at 142.

194

May, supra note 61, at 101.
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inequality,195 and of great frustration with government gridlock and inaction.196 In this
context, state attorneys general and local prosecutors had every reason to pursue, and
were expected to pursue, a vigorous antitrust policy. But lacking the prosecutorial
incentives or capacity to act, states largely left the field.
The parallels between these times and our own are manifest: once again, we live
in a time of profound economic frustration. Surveys reveal the public to be deeply
concerned about rising inequality, and to fear the increased power of large
corporations.197 Technological disruption and income inequality have produced deep
public concern.198 Some fear the federal government, bogged down by gridlock or by
sheer inertia, will not act.199 Against this backdrop, just as in the late nineteenth

195 Millon, supra note 20, at 142; notably, the period from 1890 to 1914 saw an increasing
concentration of wealth among the wealthiest within American society, a trend not empirically
matched until the present era. See generally Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Inequality in
the Long Run, 344 Science 838 (2014). That both this era, and our own, have been times of
agitation for greater state antitrust law (even if, in the case of the earlier period, such agitation
may not have produced the desired policy outcomes) intuitively suggests a potentially
meaningful correlation between such inequality and the momentum for such actions to be taken.
In any event, additional study of the empirical relationship between economic inequality and
political activity regarding commercial concentration would be a welcome complement to the
insights presented in this Article.
196

Letwin, supra note 23, at 235.

197

David Dayen, Attacking Monopoly Power Can Be Stunningly Good Politics, Survey Finds,
THE INTERCEPT (Nov. 28, 2018), https://theintercept.com/2018/11/28/monopoly-powercorporate-concentration/ (noting 2018 survey of general public in which “76 percent of
respondents were either somewhat or very concerned that ‘big corporations have too much
power over your family and your community.’ The figure grew when asked whether big
corporations have too much power over politicians: a stunning 88 percent were at least
somewhat concerned, with 71 percent very concerned.”).
198
Thomas B. Nachbar, Heroes and Villains of Antitrust, 18 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (2019)
(reviewing TIM WU THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018)); see
also Max Greenwood, Majority Supports Antitrust Review of Tech Giants: Poll, THE HILL (Aug.
5, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/456221-majority-supports-antitrust-review-oftech-giants-poll.

See, e.g., Darren Bush, President Trump’s Antitrust Division: An Essay on the Same Old,
Same Old, 70 MERCER L. REV. 671, 682–83 (2019).
199
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century, scholars200 and politicians201 alike have called for new, vigorous approaches
to antitrust enforcement.
In 2020, as in 1890, states attorneys general have much to offer antitrust
enforcement. Illegal anticompetitive conduct is often concentrated locally, rather than
nationally, making state-level enforcement especially appropriate.202 Many states have
antitrust statutes (or bodies of state law) that allow for prosecutions that the federal
laws do not.203 State governments often will have better knowledge of local economic
conditions than distant agencies in Washington, making them natural choices for

200

For recent scholarly discussions of strategies to re-invigorate antitrust enforcement, see
generally Tim Wu, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018);
Jonathan B. Baker et al., Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1916 (2018)
(introducing collection of articles on how American antitrust enforcement might be “unlocked”
and more actively applied); Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J.
710 (2017); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2017); K. Sabeel
Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public
Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1624 (2018). But see Joshua D. Wright et al.,
Requiem for A Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust, 51 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 293 (2019) (critiquing such efforts).
201

John B. Kirkwood, Market Power and Antitrust Enforcement, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1169, 1170–
71 (2018); Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem, 127
YALE L.J. FORUM 960, 962–63 (2018) (noting “bipartisan” calls for antitrust enforcement
against, among others, large technology companies).
202 See, e.g., STEPHEN D. HOUCK, NAT. ASS’N OF ATT’YS GENERAL, TRANSITION REPORT: THE
STATE OF STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, 4–5 (2009), https://bit.ly/2HdMqFB (noting that
between 1995 and 2004, state attorneys general filed many more suits alone than in multistate
coalitions, and that “the predominant focus of all the cases was industries characterized by local
markets such as health care, retail gasoline, movie theaters, banking, retail pharmacy,
department stores and asphalt.”).
203 Hovenkamp, supra note 14, at 377 (noting “activities that are not illegal under federal law
are condemned by the antitrust law of some states. Furthermore, some persons who have
suffered injury because of antitrust violations have a damages action under various state
antitrust laws while they have no such action under the federal statutes.”). See Richard A. Samp,
The Role of State Antitrust Law in the Aftermath of Actavis, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 149,
151 (2014) (noting that even where statutory language of state law is similar to federal law, state
courts may have interpreted that law “in ways that diverge sharply from federal law.”); Robert
A. Bick, An Appropriate Role Under Our Federal System for A State Antitrust Enforcement
Program, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 503, 505 (1960) (“And in situations where the [federal
Department of Justice] does bring an action, adequate local relief can sometimes only be secured
by state authorities under their own laws. Such state enforcement action may be needed either
fully to correct local aspects of a more widespread combination, or to enable states as parties
under the Federal antitrust laws, to collect damages arising out of injuries to themselves or their
subdivisions.”). This dynamic may only become more important in the event that the broad
reading of the Commerce Clause that has prevailed since the 1930’s is, as some expect it to be,
pared back, potentially reducing the constitutional boundaries of what types of activity federal
antitrust law might be permitted to prosecute. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
567 U.S. 519, 557 (2012) (finding Affordable Care Act’s “individual mandate” to have
exceeded Congressional powers under the Commerce Clause, setting meaningful substantive
limit); Meese, supra note 83, at 2184 (noting expansion of Sherman Act’s scope premised on
broad post-New-Deal expansion of permitted powers under the Commerce Clause).
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antitrust enforcement.204 And if the federal government fails to enforce the antitrust
laws, state attorneys general often have the ability and political incentives “step up”
to “fill the void.”205
Yet, if the early failure of antitrust federalism holds a single lesson, it is that even
such compelling political, historical, and economic imperatives are, without more,
insufficient to spur state antitrust action. Unless state prosecutors have the capacity
and incentives to take on the antitrust challenge, they will not act.
What does this mean for today’s state antitrust enforcers? On one hand, the years
since 1890 have seen several innovations that substantially mitigate the problem of
prosecutorial capacity. Multistate organizations like the National Association of
Attorneys General (NAAG) have allowed for coordination and information sharing
between attorneys general on antitrust matters, thus reducing the costs and burden of
such cases.206 Likewise, the rise of multistate antitrust suits brought jointly by dozens
of states allows for cost-and-capacity-sharing.207 Changes in federal law, like the HartScott-Rodino Act of 1976, created an economic incentive for states to pursue antitrust
cases by codifying the ability of state attorneys general to sue as parens patriae and
by offering states treble damages when they prevail (a strong economic incentive if
ever there was one).208
Going further, the federal government has sometimes expressly subsidized state
antitrust efforts, as with the supplemental funding offered in the Crime Control Act of
1976.209 And in some states, the capacity of the attorney general’s office has increased
to levels inconceivable at the turn of the century: New York’s Attorney General, for
instance, supervises over 1,800 employees,210 while California employs a staggering

204

Brown & King, supra note 13, at 83.

205 Celik, supra note 2; HOUCK, supra note 202, at 2–3 (describing efforts of state attorneys
general to enforce antitrust law when Reagan Administration substantially deprioritized
enforcement by federal agencies); see also Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger
Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1984, n.90 (2018) (noting “state attorneys general might fill
the enforcement gap” in those cases where federal enforcement is not forthcoming). For a recent
example of just such a case, in which the FTC declined to bar a merger but the State of Colorado
intervened instead, leading to a settlement, see Kelsey Waddill, CO Challenges, Settles
UnitedHealth, DaVita Vertical Merger, HEALTHPAYER INTELLIGENCE (June 25, 2019),
https://healthpayerintelligence.com/news/co-challenges-settles-unitedhealth-davita-verticalmerger.
206

Hawk & Laudati, supra note 27, at 19.

207

See, e.g., Saja Hindi, Colorado Joins 43 Other States in Lawsuit Alleging Generic Drug
Manufacturers Conspired to Inflate Prices, DENVER POST (May 12, 2019),
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/05/12/colorado-states-lawsuit-teva-pharmaceuticals/
(noting 44 state effort).
208 Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, tit. III, § 301, 90 Stat 1383 (improving and
facilitating the expeditious and effective enforcement of the antitrust laws).
209 Act of Oct. 15, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503, 90 Stat. 2407 (amending title I of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968); see also Flynn, supra note 94, at 481 (describing
federal “seed money” for state attorneys general antitrust efforts).
210 Our Office,
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4,500.211 Perhaps because of these shifts, it is unsurprising that in recent times at least
some state attorneys general have heeded the call to enforce state and federal antitrust
laws, from local investigations of healthcare consolidation 212 to multistate actions
against Silicon Valley behemoths like Apple and Amazon.213
Yet, despite these evolutions, the constraints of prosecutorial capacity remain a
key factor in the vigor, or impotence, of state antitrust enforcement. This is especially
salient given that many of the most important antitrust issues unfold in novel
industries, demanding an unusual degree of economic and technological savvy and
involving powerful and well-heeled entities like Amazon, Google,214 and Apple.215
Moreover, the very trend of multistate suits that allows jurisdictions to pool
antitrust resources might also allow states to “free ride,” appending their name to
litigation that is largely carried out by other states or by the federal Department of
Justice.216 In this way, a state attorney general might reap most of the political
dividends of being an “antitrust enforcement leader” without committing any
substantial resources to combatting unlawful corporate concentrations.
Finally, while a small minority of state attorneys general offices have gargantuan
staffs and budgets, many remain small, resource-starved offices whose capability to
take on “the big case”217 of a full-bore antitrust prosecution remains limited.218

211 About the Office of the Attorney General, STATE
https://oag.ca.gov/office (last visited Aug. 18, 2019).
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John Ingold, Colorado Attorney General Intervenes in $4.3 Billion DaVita-UnitedHealth
Merger Just as Deal is Finalized, COLORADO SUN (June 19, 2019),
https://coloradosun.com/2019/06/19/davita-unitedhealth-merger-colorado-attorney-general/.
213 John D. McKinnon, Group of AGs Has Been Discussing How to Address Antitrust-Related
Concerns with Google, Facebook, Apple and Amazon, WALL ST. J. (June 7, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-add-to-scrutiny-on-google-facebook-other-big-tech11559918816.
214

Id.

215

Garry A. Gabison, Public Enforcement of Private Rights, 18 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 207,
231 (2017); Andrew Chung, In Setback for Apple, U.S. Supreme Court Lets App Store Antitrust
Suit Proceed, REUTERS (May 13, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-apple/insetback-for-apple-u-s-supreme-court-lets-app-store-antitrust-suit-proceed-idUSKCN1SJ1IR.
216

Richard Wolfram & Spencer Weber Waller, Contemporary Antitrust Federalism: Cluster
Bomb or Rough Justice?, in ANTITRUST LAW IN NEW YORK STATE 1, 41 (Robert L. Hubbard &
Pamela Jones Harbour eds., 2d ed. 2002); see also HOUCK, supra note 202, at 15 (noting defense
counsel observed during multistate antitrust cases that “the states seemed to do little more than
sit silently on telephone conference calls, and [defense counsel therefore] questioned whether
this was a wise use of state resources.”).
217

McAllister, supra note 116, at 27.

North Dakota’s entire Attorney General Office, for example, consists of 40 line attorneys
and one part-time chief deputy. See Mike Nowatzki, North Dakota AG’s Office Face Staff
Shortage,
GRAND
FORKS
HERALD
(Apr.
23,
2016),
https://www.grandforksherald.com/news/4016508-north-dakota-ags-office-face-staffshortage.
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Given this dynamic, what steps might be taken to ensure state prosecutors have the
capacity and incentives to vigorously enforce antitrust laws? 219 Bringing back personal
bounties as “conviction bonuses” paid to individual attorneys would, of course, be
deeply problematic.220 But as a modern “translation,” states might refine their antitrust
statutes to ensure that where the office of the attorney general prevails in an antitrust
case, any monies won remain in that office’s control and budget, as opposed to
devolving to the legislature’s general fund.221 Doing so would create a direct
institutional incentive for state prosecutors to develop antitrust cases, knowing their
office would get to retain the resources at issue. Likewise, revisiting state statutes to
provide authorization for prosecutors to hire outside experts and counsel for assistance
could help increase capacity.222
On the federal level, targeted subsidization, especially for states that may
otherwise lack the capacity for independent antitrust action, could also pay antitrust
dividends, providing a sustainable source of funds for state antitrust work. On this
point, state legislatures might appropriate the funds for and designate attorneys to
specifically work on antitrust matters, ensuring a steady minimum of capacity to
address such cases. And of course, further multistate coordination, such as under the
aegis of NAAG, might further reduce the sting of prosecutorial capacity constraints. 223
To be sure, the full project of how today’s state antitrust enforcers might get the
capacity and incentives needed to serve as effective antitrust enforcers extends well
beyond this work’s tentative suggestions. But as even this brief sketch shows, if we
start from the empirically-based insight that prosecutorial capacity and incentives are
a key to state antitrust enforcement, we will find many paths to productive solutions.
Applying these lessons, we can ensure that today’s rising era of state antitrust
enforcement looks quite different from the first false dawn. In doing so, Senator
Sherman’s prediction might, at long last, be fulfilled.

219 Of course, this question assumes that states in fact should engage in independent antitrust
actions in the first place. That said, there are some scholars who suggest that the very concept
of sub-federal antitrust enforcement is inherently flawed, as it leads to inefficient outcomes as
compared to centralized, coordinated enforcement. See generally Richard A. Posner,
Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, 2 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 5 (2004) (doubting efficacy of state attorneys general in enforcing federal antitrust
law concurrently with the federal government). The question of rigorously justifying the overall
enterprise of state antitrust enforcement is beyond the scope of this work. That said, based on
the above discussion, there are at least strong intuitive reasons to believe that states should, at
least in some cases, serve as vigorous antitrust enforcers.
220

PARRILLO, supra note 123, at 256.

221 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-108(3) (2019) (Colorado statue permitting state
Department of Law to retain control over certain monies won in lawsuits as opposed to
transmitting such monies into general legislative funds).
222
See, e.g., Kyle Barnett, La. AG Hires Nine Private Law Firms, 17 Attorneys for Federal
Antitrust
Pharmaceutical
Lawsuit,
WASH.
EXAMINER
(Aug.
18,
2019),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/la-ag-hires-nine-private-law-firms-17-attorneys-forfederal-antitrust-pharmaceutical-lawsuit.
223 For several suggestions of steps NAAG or other organizations might take for such
coordination, see HOUCK, supra note 202, at 19 (suggesting, among other changes, joint antitrust
trial training facilitated by NAAG or a similar organization).
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APPENDIX
The following is a data-set addressing state antitrust statutory prosecutions from
1889 to 1914. For reference, list also includes four New York State common-law
decisions. Where multiple opinions address the same prosecution, they are marked by
a common symbol (*, **, ***, etc.). In total, there were 71 prosecutions generating
105 opinions. Opinions reflecting state’s confirmed hiring of private counsel to assist
the prosecution are marked with a dagger (†).
Illinois (3 prosecutions, 3 opinions)
People ex rel. Akin v. Butler St. Foundry & Iron Co., 66 N.E. 349 (Ill. 1903)
Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People ex rel. Moloney, 41 N.E. 188 (Ill. 1895)
†People ex rel. McIlhany v. Chicago Live-Stock Exch., 48 N.E. 1062 (Ill. 1897)
Kansas (10 prosecutions, 13 opinions)
State v. Aikins, 112 P. 605 (Kan. 1911)
State v. Monarch Portland Cement Co., 111 P. 487 (Kan. 1910)
State v. Glenn Lumber Co., 111 P. 484 (Kan. 1910)
*State v. Int’l Harvester Co. of Am., 106 P. 1053 (Kan. 1910)
*State v. Int’l Harvester Co. of Am., 99 P. 603 (Kan. 1909)
**State v. Wilson, 84 P. 737 (Kan. 1906)
**State v. Wilson, 80 P. 639 (Kan. 1905)
†***In re Bell, 76 P. 1129 (Kan. 1904)
†***State v. Jack, 69 Kan. 387 (1904)
†State v. Smiley, 69 P. 199 (Kan. 1902)
State v. Dreany, 69 P. 182 (Kan. 1902)
State v. Phipps, 31 P. 1097 (Kan. 1893)
In re Pinkney, 27 P. 179 (Kan. 1891)
Kentucky (6 prosecutions, 21 opinions)
Imperial Tobacco Co. of Ky. v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W. 663 (Ky. 1914)
†Am. Seeding Mach. Co. v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W. 972 (Ky. 1913)
†*Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W. 760 (Ky. 1912)
*Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W. 1199 (Ky. 1912)
*Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 146 S.W. 12 (Ky. 1912)
†*Commonwealth v. Int’l Harvester Co. of Am., 145 S.W. 400 (Ky. 1912)
†*Int’l Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth, 145 S.W. 393 (Ky. 1912)
†*Commonwealth v. Int’l Harvester Co. of Am., 144 S.W. 1068 (Ky. 1912)
†*Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W. 1064 (Ky. 1912)
†*Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W. 1070 (Ky. 1912)
*Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 138 S.W. 248 (Ky. 1911)
*Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 126 S.W. 352 (Ky. 1910)
*Commonwealth. v. Int’l Harvester Co. of Am., 131 Ky. 768 (1909)
*Commonwealth v. Int’l Harvester Co. of Am., 115 S.W. 703 (Ky. 1909)
**Am. Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 115 S.W. 755 (Ky. 1909)
**Am. Tobacco Co. v. Com., 115 S.W. 754 (Ky. 1909)
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*Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, 99 S.W. 637 (Ky. 1907)
Commonwealth v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 66 S.W. 1016 (Ky. 1902)
***Commonwealth v. Grinstead, 63 S.W. 427 (Ky. 1901)
***Commonwealth v. Grinstead, 55 S.W. 720 (Ky. 1900)
***Commonwealth v. Grinstead, 22 Ky.L.Rptr. 377 (1900)
Michigan (2 prosecutions, 2 opinions)
†Att’y Gen. ex rel. James v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 148 N.W. 420 (Mich. 1914)
Att’y Gen. ex rel. Wolverine Fish Co. v. A. Booth & Co., 106 N.W. 868 (Mich. 1906)
Minnesota (2 prosecutions, 3 opinions)
*State v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 132 N.W. 268 (Minn. 1911)
†*State v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 126 N.W. 126 (Minn. 1910)
State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 121 N.W. 395 (Minn. 1909)
Mississippi (6 prosecutions, 7 opinions)
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 54 So. 670 (Miss. 1911)
*Grenada Lumber Co. v. State, 54 So. 8 (Miss. 1911)
*Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. State, 48 So. 1021 (Miss. 1909)
†State v. Jackson Cotton Oil Co., 48 So. 300 (Miss. 1909)
†S. Elec. Sec. Co. v. State, 44 So. 785 (Miss. 1907)
State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Miss. Cotton Oil Co., 60 So. 609 (Miss. 1901)
Am. Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 22 So. 99 (Miss. 1897)
Missouri (14 prosecutions, 15 opinions)
State ex rel. Sager v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel Co., 169 S.W. 126 (Mo. 1914)
State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Ark. Lumber Co., 169 S.W. 145 (Mo. 1913)
State ex rel. Barker v. Assurance Co. of Am., 158 S.W. 640 (Mo. 1913)
State ex rel. Jones v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Works, 156 S.W. 967 (Mo. 1913)
State ex rel. Kimbrell v. People’s Ice, Storage & Fuel Co., 151 S.W. 101 (Mo. 1912)
State ex rel. Major v. Int’l Harvester Co. of Am., 141 S.W. 672 (Mo. 1911)
*State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 116 S.W. 902 (Mo.1908)
State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Kan. City Live Stock Exch., 109 S.W. 675 (Mo. 1908)
*State ex rel. Hadley v. Standard Oil Co., 91 S.W. 1062 (Mo. 1906)
State ex rel. Crow v. Cont’l Tobacco Co., 75 S.W. 737 (Mo. 1903)
State ex rel. Crow v. Swarzschild & Sulzberger Co., 73 S.W. 1132 (Mo. 1903)
State ex rel. Crow v. Armour Packing Co., 73 S.W. 645 (Mo. 1903)
State ex rel. Crow v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Co., 52 S.W. 595 (Mo. 1899)
State ex rel. Crow v. Aetna Ins. Co., 51 S.W. 413 (Mo. 1899)
State ex rel. Att’y. Gen. v. Simmons Hardware Co., 18 S.W. 1125 (Mo. 1891)
Montana (1 prosecution, 1 opinion)
State v. Cudahy Packing Co., 82 P. 833 (Mont. 1905)
Nebraska (4 prosecutions, 6 opinions)
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*State v. Am. Sur. Co., 135 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1912)
*State v. Am. Sur. Co., 90 N.W. 235 (Neb. 1911)
Howell v. State, 120 N.W. 139 (Neb. 1909)
State v. Adams Lumber Co., 116 N.W. 302 (Neb. 1908)
†**State v. Omaha Elevator Co., 110 N.W. 874 (Neb. 1906)
†**State v. Omaha Elevator Co., 106 N.W. 979 (Neb. 1906)

New York (7 prosecutions (11 with common-law), 12 opinions (19 with common
law))
*People v. Am. Ice Co., 120 N.Y.S. 41 (App. Div. 1909)
*People v. Am. Ice Co., 120 N.Y.S. 443 (Sup. Ct. 1909)
In re Att’y Gen., 100 N.Y.S 186 (App. Div. 1908)
**Att’y Gen. v. Consol. Gas Co. of New York, 108 N.Y.S. 823 (App. Div. 1908)
In re Jackson, 107 N.Y.S. 799 (Sup. Ct. 1907)
In re Interborough Metro. Co., 106 N.Y. 416 (Sup. Ct. 1907)
**In re Consol. Gas Co. of New York, 106 N.Y.S. 407 (Sup. Ct. 1907)
***People v. Am. Ice Co., 105 N.Y.S. 650 (Sup. Ct. 1907)
***People v. Am. Ice Co., 104 N.Y.S. 858 (App. Div. 1907)
****People ex rel. Morse v. Nussbaum, 67 N.Y.S. 492 (App. Div. 1900)
****People ex rel. Morse v. Nussbaum, 66 N.Y.S. 129 (Sup. Ct. 1900)
In re Att’y Gen., 47 N.Y.S. 20 (Sup. Ct. 1897)
New York Common Law Suits
People v. Duke, 44 N.Y.S. 336 (Sup. Ct. 1897)
People v. Milk Exch., 39 N.E. 1062 (N.Y. 1895)
People v. Sheldon, 34 N.E. 785 (N.Y. 1893)
*****People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 24 N.E. 834 (N.Y. 1890)
*****People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 25 Abb. N. Cas. 1 (N.Y. 1890)
*****People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 7 N.Y.S. 406 (Gen. Term 1889)
*****People v. N. River Sugar Ref. Co., 3 N.Y.S. 401 (Cir. Ct. 1889)
Tennessee (4 prosecutions, 5 opinions)
*State ex rel. Cates v. Standard Oil Co. of Ky., 110 S.W. 565 (Tenn. 1907)
*Standard Oil Co. v. State, 100 S.W. 705 (Tenn. 1907)
State v. Witherspoon, 90 S.W. 852 (Tenn. 1906)
†State v. Chilhowee Woolen Mills, 89 S.W. 741 (Tenn. 1905)
State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 59 S.W. 1033 (Tenn. 1900)
Texas (12 prosecutions, 17 opinions)
State v. Racine Sattley Co., 134 S.W. 400 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911)
State v. Brady, 118 S.W. 128 (Tex. 1909)
†*Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 106 S.W. 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907)
†*Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 103 S.W. 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907)
†**Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. State, 88 S.W. 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905)
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†**Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. State, 87 S.W. 336 ( Tex. 1905)
Nat’l Cotton Oil Co. v. State, 72 S.W. 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903)
State v. Laredo Ice Co., 73 S.W. 951 (Tex. 1903)
***State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Shippers Compress & Warehouse Co., 69 S.W. 58 (Tex.
1902)
***State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Shippers’ Compress & Warehouse Co., 67 S.W. 1049
(Tex. Civ. App. 1902)
****State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Waters-Pierce Oil Co., 67 S.W. 1057 (Tex. Civ. App.
1902)
Crystal Ice & Mfg. Co. v. State, 56 S.W. 562 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900)
San Antonio Gas Co. v. State, 54 S.W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899)
****Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 44 S.W. 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898)
Hathaway v. State, 36 S.W. 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1896)
*****Queen Ins. Co. v. State, 34 S.W. 397 (Tex. 1893)
*****Queen Ins. Co. v. State ex rel. Att’y Gen., 22 S.W. 1048 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893)
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